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Restraint and Responsibility: Judicial Review
of Campaign Reform
Spencer Overton*
The constitutionaldoctrine governing campaignfinance law allowsjudicial
outcomes to turn on often unstatedpoliticalassumptions. As illustratedby the
conflicting opinions of different United States Supreme Court Justices in
McConnell v. FEC, current narrow tailoring and substantial overbreadth
doctrinesprovide inadequateguidancefor balancingthe needfor regulation
againstthe right offree speech. This Article identifiesfour democraticvalues
thatjudges should balancein deciding whether campaignfinance laws restrict
too much protectedspeech: democraticdeliberation,widespreadparticipation,
individual autonomy, and electoral competition. Courts should make these
values the explicit basesfor reviewing campaignfinance laws in the future.
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I. Introduction
Two opposing approaches have emerged in judicial review of campaign
finance reforms. The majority and dissenting opinions in the recent United
States Supreme Court case of McConnell v. FEC' illustrate the competing
perspectives. Judges supportive of reform often tolerate regulations said to
prevent corruption, even at the expense of infiinging on some speech that poses
I.

McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
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little threat of corruption. Judges skeptical of reform err on the side of
protecting speech, even if doing so may increase the risk of government
corruption. Much more is at issue in this conflict than rhetoric about judicial
restraint or judicial responsibility to protect speech. Campaign spending and
regulations shape the outcomes of elections and legislative struggles over such
critical issues as quality health care, clean air, and tax cuts. Ultimately, the
stakes include the meaning of democracy itself.
The need to resolve this clash is now more urgent than ever. In the
aftermath of the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 and
the Court's decision in McConnell to uphold most of the Act's provisions,2
reformers have continued their crusade to close loopholes by working to
broaden other federal and state regulations. This expansion will involve
2. See infra Part I1.B (discussing in detail the various provisions of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002).
3. In the aftermath of the ban on unlimited soft money contributions to political parties, a
few individuals contributed millions to groups organized under Section 527 of the Internal
Revenue Code. These groups plan to spend such money to support or attack particular
candidates, and some reformers have worked to restrict contributions to such groups. See
Examining the Scope and Operation of OrganizationsRegistered Under Section 527 of the
Internal Revenue Code: HearingBefore the Senate Comm. On Rules, 108th Cong. (2004)
(testimony of John McCain, U.S. Senator from Arizona) (asserting that Section 527
organizations are intended to influence federal elections and therefore should be regulated like
political committees that are limited to accepting contributions from individuals of $5000 or
less); Dan Balz &Thomas B. Edsall, DemocratsFormingParallelCampaign;Interest Groups
Draw GOPFire,WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2004, at A01 (describing formation of 527 groups in the
aftermath of the ban on soft money). But see Richard Hasen, A GOP Flip-Flopon Political
Ads, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004, at M7 (asserting that under the U.S. Supreme Court's current
doctrine holding that limits on independent expenditures by individuals are unconstitutional
because such expenditures pose little threat of corruption, "it is hard to see how contributions to
[527] groups could constitutionally be regulated," at least with regard to 527s that make
independent expenditures in support of candidates and do not make contributions to candidates
or parties or make coordinated expenditures in support of such entities). Over the past ten years,
evasion has surfaced as a primary challenge to campaign reform. See MICHAEL J. MALBIN &
THOMAS L. GAIs, THE DAY AFTER REFORM: SOBERING CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE

79-96 (1998) (describing various tactics that interest groups use to
circumvent campaign finance regulations); Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder Jr., Soft
AMERICAN STATES

Money, Hard Money, Strong Parties, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 598, 598 (2000) ("American

campaign finance law is often described as more loophole than law."); Richard Briffault, The
Political Parities and Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 620, 652 (2000)

("Campaign finance reform cannot survive unless the loopholes developed or exploited by the
parties are plugged."); Richard L. Hasen, Shrink Missouri, CampaignFinance,and "The Thing
that Wouldn 't Leave," 17 CONST. COMMENTARY 483, 508 (2000) ("The pressures from voters

and reformers who will continue to challenge Buckley on the one hand, and the loophole-driven
campaign finance reality that undermines the Court's Buckley structure on the other, suggest
that something must give."); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of
Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEx. L. REv. 1705, 1708 (1999) ("First, we think political
money, like water, has to go somewhere. It never really disappears into thin air. Second, we
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regulation of additional expressive activities. Civil liberties groups will
respond immediately with litigation.
As yet, however, judges lack adequate guidance as to the point at which
reforms go too far in infringing on speech. Narrow tailoring and substantial
overbreadth tests forbid reforms that regulate an unacceptable amount of
protected speech-speech that does not pose a threat of corruption or a similar
danger. Yet even in the aftermath of the majority opinion in McConnell the
tests do not specify precisely how much of such speech a campaign finance law
must regulate before a judge should invalidate the law. Academic
commentators have also largely ignored this question, choosing instead to focus
on the general benefits of either greater or lesser regulation. This Article
represents the first step toward developing a framework that will facilitate more
principled judicial review of reforms.
Inadequate doctrinal guidance compels even the best judges to rely on
their own assumptions about politics when reviewing reforms. The judges may
cloak their decisions in First Amendment clichds like "the marketplace of
ideas" 5 or vague phrases like "preventing corruption and the appearance of
think political money, like water, is part of a broader ecosystem. Understanding why it flows
where it does and what functions it serves when it gets there requires thinking about the system
as a whole."); Justin A. Nelson, Note, The Supply and Demand of Campaign Finance Reform,
100 COLUM. L. REV.524, 531 (2000) ("The hydraulics of campaign finance make it so that
people will find creative loopholes around the limits, as long as politicians want to take that
money and people receive a benefit from giving it or spending it."). The Supreme Court has
tolerated some regulations designed not to prevent corruption directly, but to prevent the
circumvention of other regulations that directly prevent corruption. See FEC v. Beaumont, 123
S. Ct. 2200, 2209-10 (2003) ("Nonprofit advocacy corporations are... no less susceptible than
traditional business companies to misuse as conduits for circumventing the contribution limits
imposed on individuals."); FEC v. Colo.Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431,456
(2001) (asserting that "all Members of the Court agree that circumvention is a valid theory of
corruption").
4. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, The Issue ofIssue Advocacy: An Economic, Political, and
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1761, 1763 (1999) (advocating less regulation); D. Bruce
La Pierre, Campaign Contribution Limits: Pandering to Public Fears about "Big Money" and
Protecting Incumbents, 52 ADMIN. L. REv.687, 741 (2002) (same); Bradley A. Smith, Money
Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L. J. 45, 95-96 (1997)
(same); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
663,664 (1997) (same); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per- Voter: A Constitutional Principal of
Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1204, 1215 (1994) (advocating greater regulation);
Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of
Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1,27-28 (1996) (same); Burt Neubome, Towarda
Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 1055, 1057 (1999)
(same); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. &
POL'y REv. 273, 279 (1993) (same); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended
Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1390, 1392-93 (1994) (same).
5. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 412 (1984).
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corruption. ' 6 They fail, however, to detail doctrinal specifics that limit these
concepts. Instead, assumptions about the appropriate role of money in politics
animate the decisions. Unfortunately, judges often leave these assumptions
unstated because conventional First Amendment doctrine provides insufficient
avenues for judges to discuss and analyze democratic values.
Because judges' individual assumptions about politics differ, courts often
reach inconsistent decisions. These holdings sometimes neglect relevant
issues such as fair deliberation about public affairs and widespread
participation by citizens. Other holdings fail to respect the importance of
individual autonomy or the need to ensure that incumbent officeholders do not
design reforms to disadvantage challengers. Too many of the decisions go too
far in infringing on either speech or legislative authority to regulate campaigns.
The incoherent doctrine that emerges from these cases carries significant costs.
Legislatures, unclear about the shape of constitutionally permissible regulation,
often lack the will to enact what citizens perceive as much-needed reforms. As
a result, legislation is likely to be either ineffective or deemed unconstitutional.
The lack of constitutional direction also hampers compliance with, and
enforcement of, such laws by those generally skeptical of campaign reform.
This Article uses the controversy in McConnell8 illustrates the challenge
that courts face when attempting to distinguish between effective reforms that
properly close loopholes and those that go too far. Under prior law, statutes
prohibited corporations and unions from spending money on political
advertisements containing express words of advocacy, such as "vote for" or
"defeat" a particular candidate.
Corporations and unions, however,
circumvented these laws by spending money on advertisements that omitted
words like "vote for" and "defeat," but attacked or praised a particular
candidate. In response, Congress passed the electioneering provisions of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (the Act or BCRA). 9 The Act
restricted corporate and union spending on targeted advertisements that refer to
a federal candidate and are broadcast in the few weeks prior to an election,
regardless of whether such advertisements use express words of advocacy.' 0
6. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976).
7. See infra Part III (discussing and providing examples of the incoherence that emerged
from political assumptions among the Supreme Court Justices in McConnell v. FEC and in
earlier campaign finance cases).
8. McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
9. See infra Part ll.B (discussing the Act).
10. Other significant provisions of the Act banned soft money contributions and increased
hard money limits. See infra Part I1.B (explaining in detail the statute challenged in the case
and citing specific provisions).
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In McConnell, a majority of the United States Supreme Court upheld the
electioneering provisions, with four Justices dissenting." Although it was
framed in doctrinal language, the Justices' dispute in McConnell centered on
disagreements about the role of money in politics. The dissenters' focus on
unfettered political spending, for example, led them to conclude that the Act
covered too many advertisements that did not pose a threat of corruption. The
five Justices in the majority, concerned about political spending unduly
influencing elected officials, concluded that the number of advertisements that
posed no threat of corruption was small relative to the number of corrupting
activities that would occur in the absence of the statute. The lack of doctrinal
guidance allowed the Justices' personal assumptions about politics to drive
their decisionmaking.
This Article proposes that the Court expressly articulate the values that its
doctrine seeks to serve, rather than suppress the assumptions about democracy
that underlie its own opinions. The cases suggest that the Justices aim to
promote four democratic values: democratic deliberation, widespread
participation, individual autonomy, and electoral competition. Judges should
uphold reforms that, on balance, advance these values. The doctrinal origins
and the definitions of these values, as well as how ajudge would apply the test,
are detailed below. The important initial point, however, is that campaign
reforms necessarily implicate democratic values. A better judicial test should
provide an avenue for judges to consider these values explicitly when
reviewing reforms.
Although less than perfect, the new test is a better compromise of
sensitivity to context, substantive democratic values, and judicial guidance.
Substantial overbreadth and narrow tailoring doctrines inadequately define the
"prevention of corruption" rationale that justifies regulation, and they fail to
articulate the democratic objectives attained by unregulated use of money in
campaigns. Further, these conventional tests do not clearly describe the
proportion of illegitimate applications of a statute that is sufficiently
"substantial" to warrant facial invalidation of the statute. In contrast, this
Article extensively details each of the four democratic values that campaign
spending and regulations should advance. The requirement that judges
invalidate regulations that do more harm than good to these four values
provides more normative guidance than the "substantial" overbreadth doctrine.
In short, the values give legislatures clearer guidance for crafting reforms and
they provide judges more direction in protecting speech and respecting
legislative authority.
1i.

See McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 659-84 (upholding various electioneering provisions).
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A balancing test is also preferable to mechanical, bright-linejudicial rules
that categorize the activities a legislature may regulate and invalidate attempts
to regulate all other activities. Although these rigid rules provide guidance,
they would become obsolete quickly. Politics constantly evolves, and fixed
boundaries would prevent legislatures from responding to corrupting activities
outside of the predetermined categories. If the Court attempts to avoid this
problem by drawing a broader category that allows regulation of more
activities, legislatures might infringe on an unacceptable amount of speech that
poses no threat of corruption.
While political assumptions may influence judicial balancing of these
values, the concrete listing of the most important values provides at least a
common starting point from which judges can analyze cases. Absent explicitly
articulated common values, judges rely on personal assumptions about politics
that often remain unstated and avoid challenge or debate. An honest exchange
about how courts should balance the values in particular contexts, rather than
glossing over tough issues with abstract 2rhetoric and mechanical categories,
will allow for a more coherent doctrine.'
Part II of this Article illustrates the problem of campaign law
circumvention and details a legislative response to the problem through the
enactment of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. This Part also
reviews judicial tests that require statutes to be narrowly tailored and prohibit
ones that are substantially overbroad. Part Ill reviews the Court's opinion in
McConnell v. FEC. This Part also argues that overbreadth tests allow for
judicial decisions that are shaped largely by unstated normative and empirical
assumptions about politics and examines the costs of these tests. Part IV
explores the shortcomings of bright-line rules in resolving this problem. Part V
identifies four important democratic values in the campaign finance context and

applies a new test that balances these values.
II. A Loophole, a Legislative Response, and FirstAmendment Doctrine
As mentioned above, litigation surrounding the Act's provisions illustrates
the challenge courts face in distinguishing between effective reforms that
properly close loopholes and those that go too far in regulating speech that
poses no threat to state interests. This Part details the issue-advocacy loophole,
12.

Cf Frank

1. Michelman,

The Supreme Court, 1985 Term: Foreword: Traces ofSelf-

Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 35 (1986) (observing that balancing tests make a judge
"confront the parties in the flesh" and deny the judge "the refuge of objective determinacy
lodged in some force other than herself").
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the legislative response of the Act, and the First Amendment doctrine that
opponents of the legislation asserted courts should employ to invalidate the
provisions.
A. The Issue-Advocacy Loophole
Prior to 1976, the broad statutory language of the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA) purported to regulate spending "relative to" a federal
candidate 13 and spending "for the purpose of influencing" the election of a
federal candidate.' 4 In Buckley v. Valeo,' 5 the Supreme Court stated that
FECA's imprecise language raised constitutional concerns about vagueness and
overbreadth. The Court limited the scope of the statute to cover spending only
on communications that contained express words of advocacy for election or
defeat, such as "'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for
Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' [or] 'reject.'"" 6 Thereafter, FECA required
disclosure of spending on express words of advocacy and prohibited
corporations and unions from spending money on such speech.17
In 1996, a large number of individuals, parties, corporations, and unions
began funding political advertisements designed to influence elections,
including attack advertisements that cast specific candidates in a negative light.
The advertisements stopped short of using magic words such as "vote for" or
"vote against." As a result, they were not subject to FECA's disclosure
requirements or prohibitions on spending by corporations and unions.
Consider an example. In 2000, Texas billionaires Charles and Sam Wyly
aired the following advertisement in Ohio just days before that state's
Republican presidential primary:
13. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,41-42 (1976) ("The key operative language ofthe
provision [Section 608(e)(1)] limits 'any expenditure.., relative to a clearly identified
candidate."').
14. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(e) (1974) (repealed 1976) (requiring disclosure and reporting of
the use of money or other valuable assets "for the purpose of... influencing the nomination or
election of candidates for federal office").
15. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
16. Id.at44n.52.
17. See Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(2)(A) (2000) ("Each report
under this section shall disclose... contributions from persons other than political
committees."); id. § 441b(a) (stating that corporations and unions are prohibited from using
funds from their general treasuries on independent expenditures); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986) (construing the prohibition in 2 U.S.C. § 441b of corporate
spending "in connection with" any federal election to be limited to corporate spending on
express advocacy).
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Last year, John McCain voted against solar and renewable energy. That
means more use of coal-burning plants that pollute our air. Ohio
Republicans care about clean air. So does Governor Bush. He led one of
the first states in America to clamp down on old coal-burning electric
power plants. Bush's clean air laws will reduce air pollution more than a
quarter million tons a year. That's like taking 5 million
cars off the road.
8
Governor Bush, leading, for each day dawns brighter. 1

Because the Wylys avoided the use of express words of advocacy such as "vote
for Bush," they were not required to disclose the expenditure to the FEC.19 For
the same reason, federal law would not have prevented Microsoft Corporation
or the AFL-CIO from spending unlimited amounts to broadcast the pro-Bush
advertisement.
Such easy circumvention of FECA resulted in a steady growth of spending
on "issue advocacy" designed to influence federal elections. The Annenberg
Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania estimated that parties,
groups, unions, corporations, and individuals spent up to $150 million on issue
advocacy in the 1995-96 election cycle,20 $341 million in the 1997-98 cycle,2'
and $509 million in the 1999-2000 cycle.22 By comparison, FECA required
disclosure of only $36.7 million in independent expenditures on express
advocacy in support of candidates during the 1999-2000 election cycle.23
18.

CRAIG B. HOLMAN & LUKE P. McLOUGHLIN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT NYU

SCHOOL OF LAW, BUYING TIME 2000: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 2000 FEDERAL ELECTIONS

25 (2002), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/buyingtime2000
/chapter3.pdf.
19. Indeed, the advertisement included a tag line reading "paid for by Republicans for
Clean Air," misleading many to believe that an established environmental group sponsored the
advertisement. Id.
20. See DEBORAH BECK ET AL., ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR., ISSUE ADVOCACY
ADVERTISING DURING THE 1996 CAMPAIGN 3 (1997) (observing that during the 1995-96 election
cycle, political parties, labor unions, trade and business associations, and ideological interest
groups spent between $135 and $150 million-more than a third as much as did the candidates
themselves--on issue-advocacy advertising), availableat http://www.appcpenn.org/03__political
_communication/issueads/REP I6.PDF.
21.
See JEFFREY D. STANGER & DOUGLAS G. RIVLIN, ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR., ISSUE
ADVOCACY ADVERTISING DURING THE 1997-1998 ELECTION CYCLE 1 (1998) (estimating
spending on issue ads during the 1997-98 election cycle to be between $275 and $341 million).
22. See ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR., ISSUE ADVERTISING IN THE 1999-2000 ELECTION
CYCLE 6 (200 1) ("In the 2000 cycle we estimate that more than $509 million was spent on issue
advocacy television and radio advertising."), available at http://www.appcpenn.org/
03_political-communication/issueads/200 1_1999-2000issueadvocacy.pdf.
23. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE PoLmCS, TOTAL INDEPENDENT EXPENDrURES FoR/AGAINST
FEDERAL CANDIDATES, 1999-2000, at fig. 6 (Oct. 17, 2002) (indicating that entities reported to
the FEC $36,693,258 in federal independent expenditures during the 1999-2000 election cycle)
(on file with author). Note that other entities, primarily political parties, made $50,182,796 in
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B. A Legislative Response: The ElectioneeringProvisions
In response to the growth of issue advocacy, Congress passed the
electioneering provisions of the Act.24 The Act expanded FECA's regulatory
scope beyond spending on express advocacy consisting of words such as "vote
against" to include expenditures on electioneeringcommunications that mention a
candidate in the weeks before an election. Specifically, the statute defines
"electioneering communications" to consist of (1) any television, radio, cable, or
satellite broadcast (2) that refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office,
(3) run within 60 days before a general election or 30 days before a primary
election, and (4) that can be received by at least 50,000 people in the district that
the federal candidate seeks to represent. 25 To address the evasion of FECA's
provisions that require disclosure of spending on express advocacy, the Act
requires disclosure of expenditures on electioneering communications by any
spender that exceed an aggregate of $10,000 per year.26 The Act also prohibits
corporations and unions from spending money from their general treasuries on
electioneering communications. 2
This prohibition extends to nonprofit
coordinated expenditures during the cycle, and that corporations and unions expended
$17,838,437 in communication costs. Id. at figs. 2, 3, 6. Communication costs are funds used
by unions and corporations, directly from their general treasuries, to communicate political
messages expressly advocating the election or defeat of specific candidates or parties to a
restricted class, defined as the union's members and their families or the corporation's
executives, management personnel, stockholders, and their families. See 2 U.S.C. § 441 b(b)(2)
(2000) (excluding communication costs from the definition of contribution or expenditure).
24. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). McConnell v. FECis the consolidation
of eleven suits challenging various provisions of the Act. See McConnell v. FEC, Civ. No. 02CV-582 (D.D.C. May 13, 2002) (ordering consolidation). In addition to the electioneering
provisions, the Act banned "soft money" contributions, increased hard money contribution
limits, and contained other reforms. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-155, §§ 101,304, 307, 116 Stat. 81, 82, 99-100, 102-03 (2002).
25. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201, 116 Stat. 81,
88-90(2002). In the event the Court declared this definition unconstitutional, the Act provided
that an electioneering communication shall mean any broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication:
which promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a
candidate for that office (regardless of whether the communication expressly
advocates a vote for or against a candidate) and which also is suggestive of no
plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific
candidate.
Id. § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 89.
26. Id. § 201, 116 Stat. at 88.
27. Id. § 203, 116 Stat. at 91. The Act also attempted to clarify the contested question of
candidates' collaboration with funders to create issue advertisements by treating electioneering
spending that was coordinated with a candidate or party as a contribution subject to the source
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corporations, such as the National Rifle Association (NRA) and the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which receive money from business
corporations or unions.28 Political action committees affiliated with
corporations and unions, however, can continue to spend money on
electioneering communications.29
and amount limitations of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA). Id.§ 202, 116
Stat. at 90-91.
28. Not unlike FECA's restrictions on corporate spending on express advocacy, the
electioneering provisions limit most nonprofit corporations' spending. Although the
electioneering provisions' prohibitions on spending do not apply to nonprofit corporations that
operate under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (11 C.F.R. § 100.29(c)(6) (2003)),
other legal directives prohibit § 501 (c)(3) organizations from intervening in political campaigns
or expressing an opinion about a politician's position on a given issue during a political
campaign. See Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856 (10th Cir.
1972) (stating that efforts to defeat certain political candidates through public criticism violated
§ 501(c)(3)), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(1)(c)(3)(iii) (as
amended in 1990) (same). The electioneering provisions' spending prohibitions are also
inapplicable to § 501(c)(4) nonprofits that (I) have as their express purpose the promotion of
political ideas only; (2) do not engage in business activities; (3) have no shareholders or other
persons who receive any benefit that would be a disincentive for them to disassociate
themselves from the corporation if they were to disagree with the corporation's position;
(4) were not established by a business corporation or labor organization; and (5) do not accept
donations or anything of value from business corporations or labor organizations. See I I C.F.R.
§ 100.16 (2003) (codifying exemption from spending prohibitions created by the Court in
Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizensfor Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263-64
(1986)). Note that even § 501(c)(4) nonprofits that meet all of these requirements may lose
their tax-exempt status if they engage in too much campaign activity. Although the IRS has
allowed § 501 (c)(4) nonprofits to engage in some campaign advocacy, the extent of that activity
is unclear. See Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332 (stating that "the regulations do not impose a
complete ban" on campaign activities); see also Laura B. Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A
Proposalfor Peaceful Coexistence, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 308,328-29 (1990) (suggesting that
election-related activity may comprise up to somewhat less than half of the corporation's total
activity).
29. FECA allows corporations and unions to establish political action committees (PACs),
but requires that financial contributions to such PACs come from natural persons, such as union
members or corporate managers, rather than from the corporation or union's general treasury.
See Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2003) (prohibiting corporations, national
banks, and labor organizations from contributing to federal elections, and prohibiting political
committees from accepting contributions from these sources). PACs are also regulated by 2

U.S.C. §§ 432,433,434, and 44Ia (2003). Due to the ability of corporations and unions to pay
for electioneering from PAC funds, the defendants characterize the limitations on corporate and
union spending not as restrictions or prohibitions on spending, but rather as "source" rules. See,
e.g., Brief for Intervenor-Defendants Senator John McCain et al., at 43, McConnell v. FEC, 124
S. Ct. 619 (2003) (No. 02-1674) [hereinafter, Brief for McConnell Intervenor-Defendants]
("[N]othing in Title II 'bans' any speech .... Corporations and unions remain entirely free to
run an ad at any time.., so long as they use funds raised by their PACs."), available at
http://sitepilot.firmseek.com/client/clc/www/attachment.htmi/defbrief.congsponsors.redacted.
pdfid=894.
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Soon after Congress passed the Act, Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.)
and others filed suit. They claimed, among other things, that the electioneering
provisions restrict an unacceptable amount of core political speech that poses
no threat of corruption or similar danger. Specifically, they claimed that the
provisions are not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest and
that they are substantially overbroad. 30 According to plaintiffs, Buckley v.
Valeo established a firm constitutional line that prevents Congress from
regulating spending on any speech that does not contain express advocacy. 31 A
majority of a special three-judge court voted to invalidate the electioneering
provisions as overbroad,3 2 and the parties appealed the matter to the United
States Supreme Court.33
C. OverbreadthDoctrine
Courts use two First Amendment tests to determine whether to invalidate
statutes that regulate too many instances of speech that do not pose the danger
that prompted the regulation. One test focuses on whether statutes are narrowly
tailored. The other looks for statutes that are substantially overbroad on their
face.
"Suspect-content" tests require that lawmakers narrowly tailor statutes to
advance a compelling governmental interest. 34 The Court has identified the
30. See Brief for Appellants/Cross-Appellees Senator Mitch McConnell, et al. at 49-57,
McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003) (No. 02-1674) [hereinafter, Brief for McConnell
Plaintiffs] (contending that the electioneering provisions would cover communications devoted
to policy without an intent to influence a federal election, such as "advertisements that urge
support of or opposition to pending legislation where the communication merely urges the
viewer to contact an official."), availableat http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachment.
html/02-1674+brief.pdfid=848.
31. See id. at 40 (contending that in order to "eliminate constitutional overbreadth," the
Court in Buckley "drew the constitutional line at express advocacy").
32. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 798-99 (D.D.C. 2003) (Leon, J.)
(concluding that the electioneering provisions were "substantially overbroad"); id. at 364-66
(Henderson, J.) (concluding that prior cases set forth a firm constitutional rule that any
regulation of spending on political speech was substantially overbroad unless all of the speech
regulated included 'express advocacy'). Judge Kollar-Kotelly was the sole judge on the court
below to uphold the electioneering provisions. Id. at 628 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). The three-judge
court, however, upheld a backup definition of the electioneering provisions that was more vague
than the primary definition.
33. A special provision of the BCRA allowed for a direct appeal to the United States
Supreme Court.
34. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990)
("Because the right to engage in political expression is fundamental to our constitutional system,
statutory classifications impinging upon that right must be narrowly tailored to serve a
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prevention of both corruption and the appearance of corruption as compelling
governmental objectives for campaign finance regulations.35 To be narrowly
tailored, the statute must further the government's objectives, must not be
overinclusive or underinclusive to an unacceptable extent, and must not be
unnecessarily burdensome. 36 "Where at all possible, government must curtail
speech only to the degree necessary to meet the particular problem at hand, and
must avoid infringing on speech that does not pose the danger that has
prompted regulation. 3 7 Generally, heightened scrutiny functions as a rule-like
category because it presumes that regulation is impermissible.3" In the
campaign finance context, however, some regulations, such as limits on
contributions, 39 coordinated expenditures, and independent expenditures by
corporations, survive more stringent scrutiny.
A second judicial test allows for facial invalidation of "substantially
overbroad" statutes. Substantial overbreadth occurs when the proportion of
invalid applications of the statute is substantially high relative to valid
applications. 40 The doctrine works to prevent overly broad statutes from
"chilling" constitutionally protected speech. 4' Facial invalidation based on
compelling governmental interest.").
35. The Court has acknowledged additional state interests that justify disclosure
requirements: providing the electorate with the data necessary to make informed political
decisions, exposing large contributions to public scrutiny, and enforcing campaign finance laws.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976). Unless otherwise stated, this Article uses the term
'prevention of corruption" as shorthand to refer to state interests generally, and uses terms such
as "corruption" and "corrupt" to refer to the various dangers posed by political activities that
justify regulation.
36. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2417, 2422-23 (1996).
37. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 265 (1986); see United States v.
Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 430 (1993) ("The validity of [a] regulation depends on the
relation it bears to the overall problem the government seeks to correct, not on the extent to
which it furthers the government's interest in an individual case.").
38. See Richard H. Fallon Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 865
(1991) ("The 'compelling state interest' test that is applied to content-based regulations of fully
protected speech is a balancing test of a kind, but is generally not so labeled, due to the heavy
presumption that regulation is impermissible.").
39. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 385-87 (2000) (reviewing
contribution limits using a standard of scrutiny more stringent than intermediate scrutiny but
"different" from the strict scrutiny applied to expenditure limits).
40. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982) (rejecting a substantial
overbreadth claim because the statute's "legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible
applications"); Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) ("[W]e believe that the
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the
statute's plainly legitimate sweep.").
41. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612 (finding that laws burdening expression must be
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overbreadth has been described as "strong medicine" that "has been employed
by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort., 42 Some have described First
Amendment vagueness as a subset of the substantial overbreadth doctrine.43
Statutory language that requires disclosure of spending "for the purpose of
influencing" federal elections is particularly susceptible to a large
number of
44
invalid applications and therefore presents vagueness concerns.
Scholars have described First Amendment applications of the narrow
tailoring and substantial overbreadth tests as substantively identical. 4 5 Narrow
tailoring is a judicial tool used to implement substantive constitutional
principles, whereas substantial overbreadth has been described as an "ancillary"
tool with origins in First Amendment, due process, and federal courts
doctrines.4 6 Further, the narrow tailoring test can invalidate not only
overinclusive statutes but also those that are underinclusive. 47 Both doctrines,
however, balance state and private interests in expression and association. An
invalidated if the "statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression"); see also Fallon, supra note 38, at 857 ("One
theory characterizes the doctrine as procedural or prophylactic, aimed at eliminating the 'chill'
that overbroad statutes cast on constitutionally protected speech.").
42.
43.

Broadrick,413 U.S. at 613.
See Fallon, supra note 38, at 904 ("First Amendment vagueness doctrine-as distinct

from ordinary or non-First Amendment vagueness doctrine-is best conceptualized as asubpart
of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine .. ");id. at 905 ("[W]e have reason to be
sufficiently worried about vagueness to want a special First Amendment vagueness doctrine
only insofar as vagueness threatens constitutionally protected speech-that is,only insofar as
vague statutes are, or are too likely to be experienced as, overbroad.").
44.

See 2 U.S.C. § 434(e) (1974) (repealed 1976) (requiring disclosure and reporting of

the use of money or other valuable assets "for the purpose of... influencing" the nomination or
election of candidates for federal office).
45. See Richard L. Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth: Using Empirical Evidence to
Determine the Constitutionality ofCampaign Finance Laws TargetingSham Issue Advocacy,
85 MiNN.L. REv. 1773, 1782 n.46 (2001) ("Other legal doctrines, such as the requirement of
'narrow tailoring' under strict scrutiny, serve a function similar to overbreadth."); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 37 n.152 ("The issue generally is framed in
terms of the availability of less restrictive alternatives ....In the First Amendment area we

speak of overbreadth, but fashions in the use of language cannot disguise the substantive
identity of the two inquiries ....
").
46. See Fallon, supra note 38, at 866-67 ("Overbreadth has aptly been termed an
'ancillary' doctrine, which should be shaped to reflect the values and concerns that underlie
substantive First Amendment principles."); id. at 856 ("Although overbreadth doctrine rises to

prominence in the heady garden of constitutional law, the roots that define its strength lie inthe
rocky and mysterious soil of federal courts doctrines.").
47.

If the statute captures too much activity whose regulation does not advance the

purposes of the statute, the statute isnot narrowly tailored. If the statute isso narrow that it can
be circumvented easily, the statute loses its justification because there is little reason to burden
the speech covered.
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overbreadth claim is necessarily a facial challenge to a statute; a narrow
tailoring analysis can involve not only an as-applied challenge but also a facial
48
one.

Most important for this Article, both doctrines present normative and
empirical challenges in determining how many invalid applications of the
statute constitute a "substantial" amount that warrants facial invalidation.49
Therefore, the remainder of this Article will use the terms "overbroad" and
"overinclusive" to refer to overinclusiveness under both the narrow tailoring
and the substantial overbreadth doctrines. The Article will also use the term
"substantial" to refer to the amount of overinclusiveness necessary to trigger
facial invalidation under both doctrines.
Judicial application of the overbreadth doctrine is complicated because
many effective reforms are overinclusive to some degree yet do not require
invalidation. Standard-like regulations allow for an intolerable degree of
prosecutorial discretion, legal uncertainty, and chilling of speech.50 Vagueness
48.

See Richard H. Fallon Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party

Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1347 (2000) ("First Amendment overbreadth doctrine does
not stand alone in the category of constitutional tests that require statutes to be relatively fully
specified at the time of their first application and assessed in whole, rather than simply as
applied. Various 'suspect-content' tests also occupy this category."). Professor Edward Foley
distinguishes the doctrines along the lines of as-applied and facial challenges. Foley asserts that
the Court inMcConnell should first engage inessentially an as-applied narrow tailoring analysis
to determine whether Congress is entitled to regulate some particular example of genuine issue
advocacy. Even if the Court determines that the particular example is improperly regulated, it
still must engage in a substantial overbreadth analysis to determine whether the number of
improper applications is substantially high to warrant facial invalidation of the statute. See
Edward B. Foley, "Narrow Tailoring" Is Not the Opposite of "Overbreadth": Defending
BCRA's Definition of"ElectioneeringCommunications",2 ELECTION L.J. 457,472-78 (2003).

In contrast, this Article focuses on facial challenges with regard to both narrow tailoring and
substantial overbreadth doctrines and does not address as-applied challenges. The Article asks
how a court should determine when a campaign finance statute is so significantly overinclusive
in its invalid applications that it should be struck down as facially invalid under either narrow
tailoring or substantial overbreadth doctrines. Consequently, the distinction between the
doctrines is irrelevant to the primary purpose of this Article.
49. According to Henry Paul Monaghan:
[T]he dominant idea [overbreadth] evokes is serious means scrutiny. Wherever the
law mandates strict or intermediate scrutiny, a requirement of regulatory precision
is involved; a substantial congruence must exist between the regulatory means (the
statute, as construed) and valid legislative ends. Thus, the Court has reacted
interchangeably to "overbreadth" and "least restrictive alternative" challenges both
inside and outside the First Amendment context.
Monaghan, supra note 45, at 37.
50. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,41 n.48 (1976) ("[Vlague laws may not only 'trap
the innocent by not providing fair warning' or foster 'arbitrary and discriminatory application'
but also operate to inhibit protected expression by inducing citizens to 'steer far wider of the
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concerns also require that lawmakers craft campaign regulations in the form of
bright-line rules. It is difficult, however, to craft a bright-line rule that prevents
all corruption and also avoids infringing on expression that does not pose the
danger that prompted the regulation. The rule necessarily will be either
underinclusive and allow for circumvention or overinclusive and raise
overbreadth concerns."
For example, the electioneering provisions allow for circumvention
because corporations and unions may corrupt candidates by threatening to
spend money on attack advertisements prior to the final sixty days of a
campaign. On the other hand, the electioneering provisions are overinclusive
because they restrict speech that is unlikely to corrupt or appear to corrupt the
process, such as a tourism commercial narrated by a popular U.S. Senator that
airs just before an uncontested election. It is practically impossible for
legislatures to provide clearly defined exceptions in the text of a statute for all
of the varied activities that are less likely to corrupt, or appear to corrupt, the
process. 2 The failure of any bright-line rule to capture all activity that
implicates the state's interest and refrain from infringing upon any expressive
activity that does not implicate the state's interest leads to the core question
unanswered by current doctrine: How should a court determine the extent to
which a statute may err on the side of overinclusiveness to prevent
circumvention more effectively?
III. The Ambiguity of OverbreadthDoctrine
This Part reviews the conflicting opinions of the Justices in McConnell
and illustrates how the shortcomings of overbreadth doctrine allow judges to
employ personal political assumptions and suppress essential democratic values
in reviewing campaign finance regulations.

unlawful zone ...than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."' (quoting
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
433 (1963)).
51. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REv. 22, 58 (1992) ("A rule necessarily captures the background principle or policy
incompletely and so produces errors of over- or under-inclusiveness.").
52. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PI-LOsoPHIcAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 112-18 (1991) (observing that rules are
unable to include all of the possible exceptions the rule makers would desire); seealso Carol M.
Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 578 (1988) (explaining that in
the property context, "over time, the straightforward common law crystalline rules have been
muddied repeatedly by exceptions and equitable second-guessing").
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A. McConnell v. FEC
In McConnell,the United States Supreme Court upheld almost all of the
provisions of the Act. 53 Justices Stevens and O'Connor coauthored a majority
opinion that upheld the electioneering provisions, 54 and Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Souter joined in the Stevens/O'Connor opinion. The opinion
cited with approval past cases that tolerated regulation of express advocacy, 55
53. The Court invalidated two relatively minor provisions of the Act. In striking down the
prohibition on contributions by minors, the Court reasoned that the defendants provided
insufficient evidence in support of the ban and asserted that more closely tailored means were
available. McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 711 (2003). The Court also invalidated the Act's
requirement that political parties choose between unlimited independent expenditures and
limited coordinated expenditures to support their candidates. Id. at 700-04.
54. The Stevens/O'Connor opinion also analyzed and upheld the soft money restrictions
(Title I). See id. at 659-70 (upholding BCRA § 323(a), which prohibits national political
parties and their agents from soliciting, receiving, or spending soft money, but construing the
restriction on solicitation by national party officers to allow them to "[sit] down with state and
local party committees or candidates to plan and advise how to raise and spend soft money"); id.
at 670-77 (upholding BCRA § 323(b), which prevents state and local parties from using
contributions that exceed federal regulatory limits to finance "federal election activity"); id. at
678-82 (upholding BCRA § 323(d), which prohibits national, state and local parties from
soliciting funds for or making or directing any donations to certain tax-exempt organizations
that make expenditures in connection with elections for federal office, but construing the
provision narrowly to allow parties to "make or direct donations of money to any tax-exempt
organization that has otherwise been raised in compliance with FECA"); id. at 682-83
(upholding BCRA § 323(e), which limits the ability of federal candidates and officeholders to
solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend soft money in connection with federal, state and local
elections); id. at 683-84 (upholding BCRA § 323(0, which prohibits state and local
officeholders and candidates from spending soft money to fund communications that refer to a
clearly identified candidate for federal office and that promotes, supports, attacks or opposes a
candidate for that office).
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion that addressed BCRA Titles II
(miscellaneous contribution restrictions and other provisions) and IV (provisions related to
severability, effective dates, and judicial review), which was joined in its entirety by Justices
Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Souter, and in part by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and
Thomas. Justice Breyer authored the majority opinion that upheld BCRA Title V (requiring that
broadcasters keep publicly available records ofpolitically related broadcasting requests), which
was joined in its entirety by Justices Ginsburg, O'Connor, Souter, and Stevens. Hereinafter, this
Article's reference to the "majority opinion" shall mean the opinion coauthored by Justices
Stevens and O'Connor.
55. See id. at 690 ("[T]he important state interests that prompted the Buckley Court to
uphold FECA's disclosure requirements... apply in full to BCRA."); id. at 696-97 (quoting
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), for the proposition that
restrictions on corporate spending are necessary to prevent "the corrosive and distorting effects
of immense aggregations of wealth" that "have little or no correlation to the public's support for
the corporation's political ideas"). The majority states:
Prior to the enactment of BCRA, FECA required [not-for-profit] corporations, like
business corporations, to pay for their express advocacy from segregated funds
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advocacy, and thus upheld
equated electioneering communications with express
56
the regulation of electioneering communications.
The Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Constitution prohibits
Congress from regulating spending on communications that do not contain
express advocacy. 7 According to the Court, an express advocacy requirement
is "functionally meaningless" because advertisers can easily evade the
requirement and the line "has not aided the legislative effort to combat real or
apparent corruption."5 8 The Court concluded that the justifications for
regulating express advocacy apply equally to ads that do not contain express
advocacy but are "intended to influence the voters' decisions and have that
effect." 9
In two paragraphs that briefly explained its rejection of plaintiffs'
overbreadth claims, the Court stated that:

rather than from their general treasuries. Our recent decision in [FEC v. Beaumont]
confirmed that the requirement was valid except insofar as it applied to a subcategory of corporations described as "MCFL organizations"
Id. at 698.
56. See id. at 689-99 (upholding various provisions related to disclosure of disbursements
on electioneering communications, treatment ofcoordinated electioneering communications as
contributions, and restrictions on corporate, labor, and not-for-profit corporate disbursements on
electioneering communications). Note that while earlier holdings suggested that restrictions on
political spending by labor unions were constitutional, the Court in McConnell upheld
restrictions on union spending for the first time. Restrictions on non-profit electioneering were
valid as applied to not-for-profits that did not possess the characteristics of "MCFL
organizations." Id. at 699.
57. See id. at 688 ("[O]ur decisions in Buckley and MCFL were specific to the statutory
language before us; they in no way drew a constitutional boundary that forever fixed the
permissible scope of provisions regulating campaign-related speech."). The Court clarified that
past holdings limiting the regulatory scope of FECA to express advocacy were attempts to
construe regulations of spending on communications "relative to a clearly identified candidate"
and "for the purpose of... influencing" a federal election to avoid impermissible vagueness. Id.
at 688. The Court states:
Thus, a plain reading of Buckley makes clear that the express advocacy limitation,
in both the expenditure and the disclosure contexts, was the product of statutory
interpretation rather than a constitutional command. In narrowly reading the FECA
provisions in Buckley to avoid problems of vagueness and overbreadth, we nowhere
suggested that a statute that was neither vague nor overbroad would be required to
toe the same express advocacy line.
Id. The Court reasoned that the components of the electioneering communication definition
were "easily understood and objectively determinable," and thus raised "none of the vagueness
concerns" that drove the Court's analysis in Buckley. Id. at 689.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 696.
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We are therefore not persuaded that plaintiffs have carried their heavy
burden .... Even if we assumed that BCRA will inhibit some
constitutionally protected corporate and union speech, that assumption
would not "justify prohibiting all enforcement" of the law unless its
application to protected speech is substantial, "not only in an absolute
sense, but also relative to the scope of the law's plainly legitimate
applications." Far from establishing that BCRA's application to pure issue
ads is substantial, either in an absolute sense or relative to its application to
election-related
advertising, the record strongly supports the contrary
6
conclusion. 0
Justice Kennedy dissented in a separate opinion joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. 6' The Kennedy dissent acknowledged that
regulation of spending on express advocacy is easy to circumvent 62 and
generally agreed with the majority's decision to uphold the provisions requiring
disclosure of the electioneering communications. 63 The dissent concluded,
however, that the restrictions on corporate and union electioneering spending
were overinclusive. The opinion described the provision, "with its crude
temporal and geographic proxies," as "a severe and unprecedented ban on
protected speech" 64 because reference to an elected official often facilitates
communication about pending legislation and other matters that pose no threat
of corruption. The Kennedy dissent concluded that:
[The restriction on corporate and union electioneering] is a comprehensive
censor: On the pain of a felony offense, the ad must not refer to a candidate
for federal office during the crucial weeks before an election ....

60. Id. at 696-97 (citations omitted).
61. Justice Thomas also concluded that the electioneering provisions were overbroad.
Unlike the other eight Justices on the Court, however, Justice Thomas interpreted Buckley to
require that "any regulation of political speech beyond communications using words of express
advocacy is unconstitutional." Id. at 737 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). According to Justice
Thomas, Buckley construed the statutory language regulating independent expenditures to be
limited to express advocacy not merely to enhance their clarity, but to narrow their coverage.
Id. at 739 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that the express advocacy test was adopted to
"avoid problems of overbreadth" (citing FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238, 248 (1986)). For a more detailed analysis of Justice Thomas's approach, see infra text
accompanying notes 139-4 1.
62. See id.
at 761 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Government and the majority are right
about one thing: The express-advocacy requirement, with its list of magic words, is easy to
circumvent.").
63. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (asserting that the electioneering disclosure provisions
are substantially related to state interests, but noting that requirements that expenditures be
disclosed before electioneering communications have aired impose unconstitutional burdens on
speech).
64. Id. at 768 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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In defending against a facial attack on a statute with substantial
overbreadth, it is no answer to say that corporations and unions may bring
as-applied challenges on a case-by-case basis. When a statute is as out of
bounds as [the restriction on corporate and union electioneering], our law
simply does not force speakers to "undertake the considerable burden (and
sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-case litigation."
If they instead "abstain from protected speech," they "har[m] not only
themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas." Not the least of the ill effects of today's decision is
that our overbreadth doctrine, once a bulwark ofprotection for free speech,
has now been
65 manipulated by the Court to become but a shadow of its
former self.

B. NormativeJudgments
The prohibition on overbreadth forbids a statute from restricting a
substantial amount of speech that does not pose the threat that the regulation
was intended to prevent. 66 But, even after McConnell, normative questions
67
remain. For example, how much speech constitutes a "substantial" amount?
A statute that regulates a single case of speech not implicating the state interest
is probably not substantially overbroad.68 Courts have not provided guidance,
however, on the number or proportion of instances of such speech that will
trigger the doctrine.

65. Id. at 769-70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
66. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 120-21 (1991) (asserting that although the state has a compelling interest in
compensating criminal victims, there is not a compelling government interest in limiting such
compensation to the proceeds of the wrongdoers' speech); FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500-01 (1985) (finding federal law that dealt with the
independent expenditures of political action committees to be overbroad because it restricted a
number of activities that posed no threat of corruption or the appearance of corruption); First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978) (explaining that a Massachusetts
statute that would prevent a corporation from supporting or opposing a referendum proposal
even if its shareholders unanimously authorized a contribution or expenditure was
overinclusive).
67. See Fallon, supra note 38, at 893 ("The hard question, normatively as well as
doctrinally, is how the substantiality of a statute's overbreadth ought to be gauged."); Hasen,
supra note 45, at 1782 ("The term 'substantial' is hardly self-defining, and the Court in
Broadrickdid not offer much guidance. Thus, it is difficult to know how to apply the rule of
substantial overbreadth.").
68. See Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601, 630 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting
that the Court had "never held that a statute should be held invalid on its face merely because it
is possible to conceive of a single impermissible application").
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Granted, in its discussion of the soft money contribution restrictions, the
majority opinion in McConnell required only that contribution limits be
"closely drawn" rather than "narrowly tailored" to prevent corruption or the
appearance of corruption. 69 The Court stated that this less rigorous standard of
review "provides Congress with sufficient room to anticipate and respond to
concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the integrity of
the political process. 70 The opinion failed to specify, however, the amount of
protected activity that a regulation must restrict before facial invalidation is
warranted under the baseline "narrowly tailored" standard or how much more
regulation of protected expressive activity a judge applying the "closely drawn"
standard should tolerate.
The McConnell majority opinion provided even less guidance as to how
judges should review corporate and labor spending restrictions. Outside of
concluding that the amount of protected speech covered by the electioneering
provisions was not "substantial," the majority in McConnell did not detail how
future courts should determine whether a restriction on corporate or labor
spending has exceeded the extent of prophylactic room Congress enjoys in the
area.71
Not only did the majority opinion in McConnell fail to adopt sufficiently
defined tools, it did not explain its decision in a way that would provide

69. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 656 (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200, 2210-11
(2003)); see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388 (2000) (stating that with
regard to contribution limits, "the dollar amount of the limit need not be 'fine tuned').
70. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 656-57; see also FEC v. NRWC, 459 U.S. 197,210(1982)
(upholding restriction on anonprofit corporation's solicitation of contributions, stating that the
Court will not "second-guess a legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic
measures where corruption is the evil feared").
71. Earlier holdings have provided mixed signals about the tailoring of corporate and
labor spending restrictions. On one hand, the Court in Massachusetts CitizensforLife (MCFL)
invalidated a spending restriction on nonprofit corporations, stating that "[w]here at all possible,
government must curtail speech only to the degree necessary to meet the particular problem at
hand, and must avoid infringing on speech that does not pose the danger that has prompted
regulation." MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 265 (1986). The Court determined that the spending
restriction as applied to nonprofits in MCFL was "too blunt an instrument for such a delicate
task." Id. Cf Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 642 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Broad prophylactic bans on campaign
expenditures and contributions are not designed with the precision required by the First
Amendment because they sweep protected speech within their prohibitions."). On the other
hand, the Court in Austin stated a corporate spending restriction that covered less wealthy
corporations that posed little threat of corruption was not overbroad because poorer
corporations "receive from the State the special benefits conferred by the corporate structure and
present the potential for distorting the political process." Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 661 (1990) (emphasis added).
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guidance for future courts.72 Whereas the lower court judge who concluded
that the electioneering provisions were not overbroad devoted over a dozen
pages to analyzing the issue,73 the Stevens/O'Connor majority opinion
dedicated just two conclusory paragraphs to it.74 Granted, the Justices who
joined the Stevens/O'Connor opinion might have intended to refrain from
articulating a broad judicial pronouncement about overbreadth that could
obstruct future legislative attempts to respond to corruption or license excessive
legislative infringement on expressive activities.75 Or perhaps the Justices in
the majority agreed that the electioneering provisions should be upheld but did
not want to highlight the divisions in their reasoning.7 6 Whatever the rationale,
the Court's failure to provide more substantive guidance, either in its prior
cases or in McConnell, allows judges' normative and empirical assumptions
about politics to animate their overbreadth decisions in the campaign finance
context.
Indeed, not only did the Court in McConnell fail to provide guidance, but
the Justices' conflicting opinions illustrate the problems that arise from existing
overbreadth doctrine. The differences between the Stevens/O'Conner majority
opinion and the Kennedy dissent stem in part from different normative

72. Cf Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign
Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2004) (available at www.ssm.com) ("[T]he joint majority opinion [in McConnell]
fails to engage in a serious analysis of the potential overbreadth issues raised by regulating
election-time advertisements that may not in fact be intended to influence and may not even
affect federal elections.").
73. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176,625-39 (D.D.C. 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The two judges who voted to invalidate the
electioneering provisions as overbroad also collectively dedicated several pages to analyzing the
issue. Id. at 367-70 (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at 792-99
(Leon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. See supra text accompanying note 60 (quoting the McConnell majority).
75. See Spencer Overton, JudicialModesty and the Lessons of McConnell v. FEC, 3
ELECTION L.J. 305, 309 (2004) (" ... McConnell also teaches that a court reviewing campaign
finance regulations should avoid bloated opinions containing unbounded dicta not necessary to
support the decision reached by the court .... Prolonged opinions that provide elaborate
rationalizations are more likely to obstruct future legislative and judicial attempts to respond to
context-specific problems."); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely TheorizedAgreements, 108 HAiv.
L. REv. 1733, 1755 (1995) ("Once offered publicly, reasons may therefore apply to cases that
the court, in justifying a particular decision, does not have before it .... Whenever a court
offers reasons, there is a risk of future regret .... The constraint produced by the reason may
limit discretion and promote predictability, but it may also produce a bad result.").
76. See Sunstein, supra note 75, at 1733 ("When the convergence on particular outcomes
is incompletely theorized, it is because the relevant actors are clear on the result without being
clear, either in their own minds or on paper, on the most general theory that accounts for it.").
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assumptions of the Justices about the value of the expressive activity restricted
and the state interest advanced by the regulation."
For example, the majority opinion focused on the electioneering
provisions' reduction of circumvention of laws designed to prevent corruption.
Although the Court explicitly acknowledged that the "precise percentage of
[restricted] issue ads" that "had no electioneering purpose" was "a matter of
dispute," it recognized that "the vast majority of ads" clearly had an
electioneering purpose.78 From the majority's perspective, the number of
advertisements that did not influence federal elections represented a minority of
the total ads regulated by the statute, and therefore the statute should not be
considered overbroad.
In contrast, the Kennedy dissent focused on the importance of the speech
improperly restricted by the electioneering provisions. The opinion presented a
hypothetical in which the electioneering provisions prevent a nonprofit
environmental group from running an ad opposing a proposed law that would
allow more logging in national forests. 79 According to the Kennedy dissent, a
reference to the incumbent sponsors of the bill might be the most effective way
to communicate with the public about the merits of the bill, as the names of the
bill's sponsors might have become synonymous with the proposal80 or the wellknown ideological biases of the sponsors might provide essential information to
citizens about the content of the bill.8 ' Because the sponsors otherwise possess
strong environmental records or face little competition, the environmental
group lacks any interest in corrupting the process by threatening to spend vast
sums to defeat the incumbents.8 2

77. The divergent decisions of three lower court judges in McConnell v. FEC also
illustrate the challenges courts face in determining the normative meaning of "substantial"
overbreadth. United States District Court Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly wrote that the
"overwhelming majority" of the ads restricted under the new law were designed to affect
elections and voted to uphold the definition of electioneering communication. McConnell, 251
F. Supp. 2d at 633. District Court Judge Richard Leon believed that up to 17% of the speech
restricted did not pose a threat of corruption, and voted to strike down the primary provision as
"substantially overbroad." Id. at 777. District of Columbia Circuit Court Judge Karen LeCraft
Henderson asserted that any regulation of spending on political speech was substantially
overbroad unless all of the speech regulated included "express advocacy." She therefore voted
to invalidate the provision. Id. at 293.
78. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 696.
79. Id. at 769 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
80. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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While the Kennedy dissent did not identify definitively the proportion of
ads without an electioneering purpose,8 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy and Scalia thought that the hypothetical environmental group's ads
and similar forms of expression are incredibly important to communicating
with citizens and elected officials about legislative matters. In light of the
importance of this speech, these Justices concluded that the statute was
overbroad.
The disagreement between the majority opinion and the Kennedy dissent
stems from different value-based judgments about the normative definition of
"substantial" overbreadth. The Kennedy dissent emphasized unfettered
spending and believed that speech like that of the hypothetical environmental
group was sufficiently valuable that the costs of its restriction would outweigh
the benefits that would result from legitimate applications of the statute. An
emphasis on other important values-the prevention of corruption and the
appearance thereof-led the majority to reject the overbreadth claim.
To illustrate, assume that Senator Green and Senator Soot introduce the
pro-logging Green-Soot Act a few weeks before election day and that due to
news coverage the pro-logging bill is synonymous with the names of the two
senators. Senator Green has a strong pro-environment record and has little
competition in his reelection bid. On the other hand, Senator Soot has a history
of rolling back environmental protections and faces a tightly contested election.
Also imagine that the electioneering provisions would prevent the
environmental group from threatening to run one hundred candidate
advertisements attacking Senator Soot that are, for the sake of argument,
corrupting. The group also plans to run ten advertisements in Green's state
detailing the problems with the Green-Soot bill that pose no threat of
corruption.84

83. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990) (commenting that in previous
decisions, overbreadth has not only had to be "real, but substantial as well,judged in relation to
the statute's plainly legitimate sweep" (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615
(1973))); see also Fallon, supra note 38, at 893-94 (stating that the Supreme Court has
"occasionally tried to express the substantiality requirement interms of a geometric proportion.
The proper comparison, it has been suggested, is between the number of cases to which a court
might constitutionally apply a statute, and the number of cases inwhich the statute's application
would violate constitutional rights."); Hasen, supra note 45, at 1783 ("[Tjhe question of
substantial overbreadth involves a comparative effort; one looks at the proportion of overbroad
applications of the statute compared to legitimate ones .... [T]he substantial overbreadth
requirement, however,.. . fails to define the relevant proportion.").
84. Note that one can argue that advertisements about bills named after congressional
sponsors could corrupt candidates, just as a threatened attack on a bill in its sponsor's home
district could be construed as an attack on the sponsor for whom the bill is named.
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The focus by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
on preventing the corrupting influence of the one hundred attack ads might lead
them to believe that the ten Green-Soot issue advertisements do not constitute a
"substantial" amount of speech. Plaintiffs, after all, can bring a claim
challenging the electioneering communications as applied to the ten Green-Soot
advertisements.
Even if Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Scalia accepted the premise that
corporate attack ads corrupted politics, their focus on the importance of the ten
Green-Soot issue advertisements would likely lead them to the conclusion that
such speech constituted a "substantial" amount. To this group, the option to
challenge these specific instances on an as-applied basis is inadequate. The
possibility that the statute's language or the cost of filing a lawsuit will chill
speech outweighs the importance of preventing any threat of corruption posed
by the one hundred attack advertisements.85
The Justices' varied approaches to weighing the properly regulated
activity against improperly regulated activity also stems, in part, from
differences in their normative understandings of the state interest that justifies
restrictions on campaign spending. For example, the Justices who joined the
Stevens/O'Connor majority opinion accepted that restrictions on corporate
spending on express advocacy are necessary to prevent "the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with
the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public's support for the corporation's political ideas. 8 6 According to the
majority, the question of whether the state interest in restricting corporate
85. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 769-70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (asserting that as-applied
challenges are considerably burdensome, and that if speakers "'abstain from protected speech,'
they 'har[m] not only themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas"').
86. Id. at 695-96. The majority expanded its discussion of the meaning of corruption in
its discussion of the soft money restrictions. The majority conceived of the legitimate state
interest in regulating political contributions not merely as preventing quid pro quo corruption,
but also curbing "undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, and the appearance of such
influence." Id. at 746-47 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). A quid-proquo view of corruption "ignores precedent, common sense, and the realities of political
fundraising. . . ." Id. at 665. Corruption is not evidenced by altered legislative votes alone, but
may also result in less obvious distortions, such as "manipulations of the legislative calendar" or
the sale of "access." Id. at 666. In the absence of regulation, the special access given to large
contributors results in an appearance of corruption that erodes public confidence and
participation in the political process. See id. at 664-65 (observing that large contributions result
in access to high-level government officials, and that such access results in an appearance of
corruption); id. at 656 ("Because the electoral process is the very 'means through which a free
society democratically translates political speech into concrete governmental action,' ...
contribution limits... tangibly benefit public participation in political debate.").

61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 663 (2004)
spending is compelling was "easily answered" by prior campaign finance
decisions that "represent respect for the 'legislative judgment that the special
characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful
regulation.' 8 7 In evaluating the expressive activities that properly fall under
the scope of the electioneering provisions, therefore, the majority included
corporate and labor spending on communications that are intended
to influence
88
-voters' decisions in candidate elections and have that effect.
Justices who joined the Kennedy dissent, on the other hand, would strike
down all regulations other than those necessary to prevent quid pro quo
corruption. 9 Justice Kennedy indicated that the "corrosive and distorting"
corruption rationale used to justify restrictions on corporate and union spending
in candidate elections is amorphous, unbounded, and unjustified and should be
overruled. 90 As Justice Kennedy wrote, "The mere fact that an ad may, in one
fashion or another, influence an election is an insufficient reason for outlawing
it. I should have thought influencing elections to be the whole point of political
speech." 9' According to the Kennedy dissent, corporate and labor spending
represent critical political activity that should remain unrestricted.92
Consequently, even though the Kennedy dissent purports to accept the
state interest in restricting corporate spending for the sake of analyzing the
overbreadth of the electioneering provisions, 93 it should not be surprising that
the dissent places less weight on the benefits gained by the electioneering
provisions' limitation on corporate and union spending.94 The varied
87. Id. at 695 (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200, 2207 (2003) (quoting FEC v.
Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1982))).
88. See id. at 696 ("The justifications for the regulation of express advocacy apply equally
to ads aired during those periods if the ads are intended to influence the voters' decisions and
have that effect.").
89. See id. at 747 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The majority
ignores the quid pro quo nature of the regulated conduct central to our earlier decisions.").
90. Id. at 762 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Instead ofextendingAustin to suppress new and
vibrant voices, I would overrule it and return our campaign finance jurisprudence to principles
consistent with the First Amendment.").
91. Id. at 770 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in pan).
92. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that "the
majority's ready willingness to equate corruption with all organizations adopting the corporate
form is a grave insult to nonprofit and for-profit corporations alike, entities that have long
enriched our civic dialogue").
93. Id. at 766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Even under
Austin, BCRA § 203 could not stand .... § 203 .. . is far from narrowly tailored.").
94. See id. at 772 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The severe
First Amendment burden of this ban on (corporate and union] independent expenditures
requires much stronger justifications than the majority offers.").
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approaches of the majority opinion and the Kennedy dissent stem, in part, from
different normative assessments of the weight to give the state interest
advanced by the electioneering restrictions.
C. EmpiricalAssumptions
In addition to normative judgments about the meaning of "substantial"
overbreadth, the Justices and litigants in McConnell made politically-charged
empirical assumptions. These questions are factual, such as the percentage of
regulated activities that if unregulated would pose no threat of corruption.
For example, although the majority opinion refused to specify the precise
percentage of issue ads regulated by the electioneering provisions that had no
electioneering purpose and thus presumably posed little threat of corruption, it
found that the "vast majority of ads" clearly had an electioneering purpose. 95
Thus, the Court concluded, "[flar from establishing that BCRA's application to
pure issue ads is substantial... the record strongly supports the contrary
conclusion."9 6 While the Kennedy dissent also avoided specifying the precise
percentage of speech improperly covered by the electioneering provisions, it
did claim the provisions constitute "a severe and unprecedented ban on
protected speech .... Never before in9 7our history has the Court upheld a law
that suppresses speech to this extent.
Both the majority opinion and the Kennedy dissent rely on the Justices'
own empirical assumptions about whether particular instances of speech
covered by the regulation pose a threat or appearance of corruption. While the
Justices do not elaborate on these assumptions in their opinions, a debate
between the parties to the litigation illustrates the conflict. Because of their
emphasis on unfettered speech, plaintiffs cited the following advertisement
sponsored by the American Association of Health Plans as a "true issue
advertisement that would be unfairly captured" by the electioneering
provisions:
Worried about rising health-care costs? Then look out for the trial lawyers.
They want Congress to pass new liability laws that could overwhelm the
system with expensive new health care lawsuits. Lawsuits that could make
trial lawyers richer. That could make health care unaffordable for millions.
Senator Lauch Faircloth is fighting to stop the trial lawyers['] new laws.

95.
96.
97.

Id. at 696.
Id. at 697.
Id. at 768-69 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Call him today and tell him98to keep up his fight. Because if trial lawyers
win, working families lose.

The defendants countered that the advertisement was designed to
influence an election, posed a threat of corruption, and therefore implicated the
government interest advanced by the electioneering provisions. Senator Lauch
Faircloth was in a close race against trial lawyer John Edwards. Other
advertisements portrayed Edwards as a "deceptive, truth-stretching trial
lawyer." 99 In this context, the defendants argued, the tag line of the American
Association of Health Plans' advertisement "may as well have read 'if John
Edwards wins, working families lose." ' 00
The Justices also make different empirical assumptions about the burden
on speech under the electioneering provisions. The majority assumes that
corporations and unions can easily engage in political advocacy by paying for
an ad from a separate PAC.'0 According to the Kennedy dissent's assessment
of political reality, however, a PAC does not effectively represent the views of
the "corporation as a corporation,"'10 2 a PAC does not allow the public to
evaluate the credibility of the organizational speaker, 0 3 and complex and
burdensome PAC regulations chill speech by several organizations. 0 4 Whereas
98. Brief for McConnell Plaintiffs, supra note 30, at app. 9a.
99. Opposition Brief of Defendants at 82, McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176
(D.D.C. 2003) (No. 02-0582), available at http://sitepilot.firmseek.com/client/cc/www
/attachment.html/F+Electioneering+Communications.pdf?. id=379.
100. Id.
101. See McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 695 ("Because corporations can still fund electioneering
communications with PAC money, it is 'simply wrong' to view the provision as a 'complete
ban' on expression rather than a regulation .... The PAC option allows corporate political
participation without the temptation to use corporate funds for political influence ... "(quoting
FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200, 2211 (2003))).
102. Id. at 766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("What the law
allows-permitting the corporation 'to serve as the founder and treasurer of a different
association of individuals that can endorse or oppose political candidates'-'is not speech by
the corporation."' (quoting Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 681
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
103. Id. at 768 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy
states:
Forcing speech through an artificial "secondhand endorsement structure...
debases the value of the voice of nonprofit corporate speakers... [because] PAC's
are interim, ad hoc organizations with little continuity or responsibility." In
contrast, their sponsoring organizations "have a continuity, a stability, and an
influence" that allows "their members and the public at large to evaluate their...
credibility."
id. (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 708-09 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
104. Id. at 766-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[PAC]
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the majority surmises that corporations and unions can effectively engage in genuine
issue advocacy by avoiding a reference to a federal candidate,' °5 Justice Kennedy
believes that avoiding a reference to a federal candidate diminishes the
communicative effectiveness of many issue ads to an intolerable degree. 0 6 While
each of the conflicting versions of political reality is plausible, the Justices fail to
ground their empirical assumptions in an extensive evidentiary record.
As illustrated by the examples above, empirical assumptions by the Justices
and the litigants often involve ad hoc, contestable conjecture about the frequency of

electioneering spending, the probability that unregulated spending will corrupt the
political process, the extent of such corruption, and the feasibility of altemative
avenues of expression under the regulations.' 07 Such speculation also extends to the
probability and extent to which the electioneering provisions will prevent
corruption, the frequency of activities that will not pose a threat of corruption being
regulated,'0 8 and the probability that less restrictive alternatives will prevent an
equal amount of corruption.
The current doctrine's failure to provide guidance allows normative and
empirical political assumptions to drive the litigants' arguments and judicial
decisionmaking.' °9 In the absence of clearer doctrinal guidance, many judges
regulations are more than minor clerical requirements. Rather, they create major disincentives
for speech, with the effect falling most heavily on smaller entities that often have the most
difficulty bearing the costs of compliance.").
105. Id. at 696 ("Moreover, whatever the precise percentage may have been in the past, in
the future corporations and unions may finance genuine issue ads during those time frames by
simply avoiding any specific reference to federal candidates ...").
106. See id. at 769 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referencing
situations in which the identity of a bill's sponsors provides "essential instruction to citizens on
whether the policy benefits them or their community" or when the sponsors have become so
synonymous with the proposal that reference to the politicians "is the most effective way to
communicate with the public").
107. Cf.Elliot L. Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65
HARV. L. REv. 1,28 (195 1) (discussing clear and present danger, and arguing that the "ultimate
question of constitutionality depends... on subsidiary determinations with respect to probability,
gravity, and necessity").
108. According to Richard H. Fallon, Jr.:
The hard question, normatively as well as doctrinally, is how the substantiality of a
statute's overbreadth ought to be gauged. The Supreme Court has occasionally
tried to express the substantiality requirement in terms of a geometric proportion.
The proper comparison, it has suggested, is between the number ofcases to which a
court might constitutionally apply a statute, and the number of cases in which the
statute's application would violate constitutional rights.
Fallon, supra note 38, at 893-94.
109. Cf Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (indicating that a prominent characteristic
of a case that involves a political question may be "the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion"); Frederick Schauer,
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inclined to favor a campaign regulation can find some plausible explanation as to
how it prevents at least the appearance of corruption or provides adequate avenues
for expressive activity." 0 Judges skeptical of reform can imagine a multitude of
activities that might arise in the future and would fall under the statute, but that
would not corrupt the process. "' In summary, the seemingly neutral application of
the conventional overbreadth doctrine conceals judges' and litigants' value-laden
empirical assumptions and normative aspirations for democracy.
D. The Costs of Ambiguity
Significant costs accompany the doctrine's failure to provide courts with
adequate guidance in resolving questions about campaign regulations that are
JudicialReview of the Devices of Democracy,94 COLUM. L. REV. 1326, 1332 n. 18(1994) ("In
the absence of the canonical formulation, judicial power to create and, at the same time, apply
the analogizing rule likely locates much of the purchase for the judge's decision in what the
judge believes the result in the present case simply ought to be.").
110. CompareBeaumont, 123 S. Ct. at 2211 (concluding that prohibition on contributions
by certain nonprofits is "closely drawn" because nonprofits can establish segregated political
action committees), Nixon, 528 U.S. at 395-96 (reasoning that state contribution limits are
adequately tailored because candidates can still amass resources needed for effective advocacy),
Austin, 494 U.S. at 661 (concluding that restriction on corporate spending that includes less
wealthy corporations is "not substantially overbroad" because less wealthy corporations "present
the potential for distorting the political process"), and Mass. CitizensforLife, Inc., 479 U.S. at
268 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that regulations restricting corporate spending
properly extend to nonprofit corporations because the differences between nonprofit and
business corporations are "'distinctions in degree' that do not amount to 'differences in kind"'),
with Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604,642-43 (1996) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that restriction on coordinated party
spending is not narrowly tailored because "the statute indiscriminately covers the many
conceivable instances in which a party committee could exceed the spending limits without any
intent to extract an unlawful commitment from a candidate"), Austin, 494 U.S. at 688 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that restriction on corporate spending is not narrowly tailored because it
applies to less wealthy corporations that lack "amassed 'war chests"'), Mass. Citizensfor Life,
Inc., 479 U.S. at 263 (observing that restriction on corporate spending improperly included
certain nonprofit corporations because they "have features more akin to voluntary political
associations than business firms"), and First Nat 'l Bank of Boston, 435 U.S. at 794 (reasoning
that the "overinclusiveness" of restriction on corporate spending on ballot questions to protect
dissenting shareholders is demonstrated by fact that restriction also bans corporate spending
unanimously authorized by shareholders).
11.
See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 233-34
(1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (adopting Blackmun's concurrence in Illinois State Bd. of
Elections v. Socialist Workers Party); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party,
440 U.S. 173, 188-89 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[F]or me, 'least drastic means' is a
slippery slope .... A judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with
something a little less 'drastic' or a little less 'restrictive' in almost any situation, and thereby
enable himself to vote to strike legislation down.").
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heavily charged with partisan political interests. As explained by many
commentators, improper judicial deference to campaign reforms may result in
excessive suppression of expressive and associational values." 2 The lack of
guidance provided by the doctrine allows for the charge that the majority's
opinion was driven by ideology rather than law." 3
On the other hand, unnecessary judicial invalidation of campaign
regulations infringes on legislative authority." 14 Article I, Section 4 of the U.S.
Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate federal elections." 5
Nebulous overbreadth doctrines fail either to constrain judicial power from
infringing upon the discretion entrusted to the legislature by the Constitution or
to give notice to legislatures and citizens as to how courts will implement the
Constitution's balance of individual rights and lawmaking. 16 Improperjudicial
invalidation sacrifices the state's interest in preventing the corruption and the
appearance of corruption that flow from the activities that the statute would
112. See, e.g., Robert Bauer, McConnell, Parties and the Decline of the Right of
Association, 3 ELECTION L.J. 199 (2004) (asserting that McConnell failed to address the impact
of the challenged campaign regulations on associational rights); Lillian R. BeVier, McConnell
v. FEC: Not SenatorBuckley's FirstAmendment, 3 ELECTION L.J. 127, 145 (2004) (asserting
that in dissenting in McConnell, "Justice Scalia was surely right when he bemoaned the 'sad day
for the freedom of speech."') (quoting McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 720 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part)); Hasen, supra note 72 (asserting that "[tihe result [of McConnell] is
jurisprudential incoherence and a lead opinion in the most important campaign finance case in a
generation that appears to pay only cursory attention to the First Amendment interests that must
be balanced in evaluating any campaign finance regime").
113. See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission: Ideology
Trumps Reality, Pragmatism, 3 ELECTION L.J. (forthcoming 2004) ("Ideology, not a careful
consideration of facts, theory, or the real-world effects of legislation, appears to drive the
majority to repeatedly fashion its opinion in such categorical terms.").
114. Cf Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (indicating that prominent characteristics
of a case involving a political question may be "a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department" or "the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government"). Unlike Baker, which involved a state legislature's decisionmaking,
the McConnell litigation involves some questions to be decided by Congress, a political branch
of government co-equal with the Court.
115. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The times, places and manner of holding elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but
the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of
choosing Senators."); see also Mark C. Alexander, Campaign Finance Reform: Central
Meaning anda New Approach, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 767, 838-39 (2003) (asserting that the
Guarantee Clause's mandate to protect the republican form of government in the states
empowers Congress to enact campaign finance reform).
116. Cf Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (noting that a prominent characteristic of a case involving a
political question maybe "a lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving"
the case).
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have otherwise regulated.' 1 7 One rationalization for judicial hypersensitivity to
campaign regulation is a special concern for speech, but erring on that side of
the scale is not without social and constitutional costs.
Unique problems in applying the overbreadth doctrine to review campaign
finance regulations arise from the political nature of the context as well as the
institutional limitations of courts. Campaign finance implicates not only
individual rights but also values related to political structure, such as
democratic deliberation, widespread participation, and electoral competition. ' 8
Judicial decisions in the campaign finance context are likely to result in
unanticipated consequences or become obsolete due to legal, technological, and
social changes in campaign methods and fund-raising practices. Unlike
legislatures, federal judges do not regularly consider questions of political
structure and are not democratically accountable. Further, courts possess fewer
comprehensive fact-finding tools to make judgments about political activities
and regulations.
In light of the institutional limitations of court, the political nature of
campaign finance, and the important democratic values furthered by both the
political use of money and the regulation of such use, judges need more
guidance than the current overbreadth doctrine provides." 9 Commentators and
courts have extensively analyzed the manageability of doctrines and competing
democratic values in other contexts, such as the relative population of
legislative districts, 20 partisan gerrymandering,'
the use of race in
117. See Virginia v. Hicks, 123 S. Ct. 2191,2197(2003) ("[T]here are substantial social costs
created by the overbreadth doctrine when it blocks application of a law to constitutionally
unprotected speech .... To ensure that these costs do not swallow the social benefits of declaring
a law 'overbroad,' we have insisted that a law's application to protected speech be 'substantial.'").
118. Scholars have recognized structural issues in other areas of the law of democracy. See
Heather K. Gerken, Understandingthe Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARv. L. REv. 1663, 1666
(2001 ) (arguing that vote dilution claims cannot be squeezed into the conventional individual-rights
framework that the Court has chosen); Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term: [E]Racing
Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARv. L. REv. 109, 113 (1994) (emphasizing the
inadequacy of existing voting rights jurisprudence for handling claims involving racial groups);
Samuel Issacharoff& Richard H. Pildes, Politicsas Markets: PartisanLockups of the Democratic
Process, 50 STAN. L. REv. 643, 648 (1998) (asserting that the judiciary "invert[s] the focus of
constitutional doctrine from the foreground of rights and equality to the background rules that
structure partisan political competition"); Daniel R. Ortiz, From Rights to Arrangements, 32 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 1217, 1218 (1999) (observing that election law's evolution "has led us away from a
largely rights-based, individual-centered view ofpolitics, to a more pragmatic and structural view
of politics as a matter of institutional arrangements").
119. Cf Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962) (articulating that a variety of indicators may
suggest that a case involves a nonjusticiable political question, including "a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [an issue]; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion").
120. See JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 124 (1980) (explaining that the Court
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implementing the Voting Rights Act,' 22 and ballot-access cases. 123 Although
of campaign finance
adequate doctrinal guidance is crucial to judicial review
124
regulations, the issue remains largely unexamined.
IV. The Rigidity of Bright-LineJudicialRules
Courts have devised various tests to aid them in balancing individual
rights and lawmaking as they believe the Constitution intended. 25 Courts have
created these tools both to constrain judicial power from infringing upon the
discretion entrusted to the legislature by the Constitution and to give notice to
society as to how courts will implement the Constitution. The tools determine
the appropriate scope of legislative authority over campaign finance, or what
this Article refers to as the boundaries of campaign reform.
adopted a one-person, one-vote rule "precisely because of considerations of administrability").
121. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 155-56 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(arguing that the standard adopted by the plurality will "prove unmanageable and arbitrary" and
result in "greater judicial intrusion into the apportionment process"); see also Peter H. Schuck,
The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1334 (1987) (outlining a test requiring that the electoral system be
arranged to frustrate voting groups' influence on the political process).
122. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1012 & n.9 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(observing the difficulty and practical impossibility of discerning the primary motive of the
legislature in the apportionment process); see also Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi,
Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District
Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV.483, 508 (1993) (observing that judicial
review of expressive harms of racial considerations in redistricting recognized in Shaw is
"fraught with complexity and unlikely to yield determinate, single right answers").
123. See Elizabeth Garrett, Is the PartyOver? Courtsand the PoliticalProcess,2002 SuP.
CT. REV.95, 115-30 (2002) (discussing,various judicial approaches to ballot-access cases).
124. In the aftermath of Buckley v. Valeo, Judge Harold Leventhal highlighted courts'
relative inexperience with problems of political organization, and counseled judges to proceed
pragmatically and carefully, to avoid a rush to judgment based on speculation, and to avoid
dogma that precludes reconsideration and correction. Harold Leventhal, Courts and Political
Thickets, 77 COLuM. L. Rv.345, 376, 378-80, 387 (1977). While he emphasized the
importance of judicial humility and caution in reviewing campaign finance regulations, Judge
Leventhal did not explore doctrines that would provide judicial guidance. See generally id.
Richard Briffault observed that courts tolerate greater regulation of activities closer to elections,
that similar treatment should extend to the regulation of political money, and that a statute like
the Act is closer to elections and should be rendered constitutional. See generally Richard
Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/PoliticsLine, 77 Tnx. L. REv.1751 (1999).
Briffault did not explain, however, how courts should determine the "elections/politics" line.
See generally id.
125. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, I ll HARV. L. REV. 54, 57, 67-75 (1997) (outlining the tests
developed by the Supreme Court in defining constitutional doctrine).
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As illustrated above, the overbreadth doctrine both prior to and in the
aftermath of McConnell provides inadequate direction tojudges in determining
the appropriate boundaries of reform. A judicial tool in the form of either a
bright-line rule or a balancing test that weighs clearly identified values would
provide greater guidance to courts. This Part analyzes the strengths and
weaknesses of four alternative rule-based tests that the Court might adopt. It
ultimately concludes that the rules overlook important democratic values and
are too rigid to respond to the evolving nature of campaign practices and
reforms.
The two most straightforward rules involve either judicial tolerance of
almost all reforms or judicial invalidation of all reforms. Courts could also
adopt fixed categories of the particular campaign activities that political bodies
may regulate. For example, the Court could adopt a content-based judicial rule
that invalidates all statutes that purport to regulate spending on speech that does
not contain express advocacy. The Court could also craft a multidimensional
rule that allows regulation of activities based on predetermined factors related
not only to content, but also to timing, audience, and speaker identity.
A. Deference to Reforms
Some have proposed that the judiciary defer to legislative decisions
regarding campaign finance,' 26 and this approach would provide greater
guidance to judges than current doctrine.' 27 Proponents of a passive judiciary
assert that judges should allow campaign finance battles to occur in the
political, rather than in the judicial arena. Democracy requires that people use
democracy to decide how democracy will be structured. 2 ' Courts tolerate other
126. See C. Edwin Baker, CampaignExpendituresandFree Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 1, 24, 46 (1998) (claiming that "the overall electoral process, including campaignoriented speech, should be viewed as a special governmental institution" which can be regulated
by legislatures); Briffault, supra note 124, at 1768 ("Election-related activities are different, and
necessarily subject to more regulation, than other forms of political activity."); Frederick
Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, ElectoralExceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEx. L.
REv. 1803, 1804 (1999) (exploring whether "electoral politics---or even elections simplicitercould also be the subject of special election-specific First Amendment principles because of
their special role in democracy").
127. See Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategiesin Constitutional Law: Lessons for Getting the
Least Dangerous Branch Out of the Political Thicket, 82 B.U. L. REv. 667, 698 (2002)
(asserting that, with regard to the Shaw v. Reno cases, the Court can disentangle itself from "the
political thicket" by "recast[ing] the form of review in highly deferential terms, and leav[ing]
enforcement of this constitutional constraint to the political branches, as [the Court] did in the
areas of economic due process and the Commerce Clause").
128. See Schauer, supra note 109, at 1335 (articulating the argument that "if the people
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restrictions in the election context, such as prohibitions on campaigning within
100 feet of a polling place, 2 9 because such restrictions promote democratic
deliberation.'3

The deference approach would uphold not only the electioneering
provisions' disclosure requirements and spending restrictions but also the
remainder of the Act. The campaign finance structure as a whole could operate
as Congress intended. 3' Further, deference would allow more expansive
reforms such as restrictions on32individual and candidate spending, essentially
overruling Buckley v. Valeo.'
One approach to deference would involve the Court declaring challenges
to campaign finance regulations nonjusticiable and exiting the field altogether.
However, while a judicial declaration that all challenges to campaign finance
regulations are nonjusticiable provides guidance to judges, it ignores important
First Amendment values. Courts protect speech from regulation to preserve
individual autonomy and to prevent incumbent legislators from enacting speech
regulations designed to disadvantage political challengers. Complete deference
to democratic decisionmaking in the campaign finance context would sacrifice
cannot in democratic fashion make decisions about what their democracy will look like, then the
notion of democracy is hollow").
129. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (holding that because "the exercise
of free speech rights conflicts with [the fundamental] right to cast a ballot in an election free
from the taint of intimidation and fraud... some restricted zone around polling places is
necessary to protect that fundamental right").
130. See Schauer & Pildes, supranote 126, at 1817 ("Thejustification of these structures is
that they promote a 'fairer' mode of representation, that they enhance the deliberative quality of
choosing candidates and making policy, or that they improve the quality of voter
decisionmaking.").
131. Cf McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 659 ("Because the five challenged provisions of § 323
implicate different First Amendment concerns, we discuss them separately. We are mindful,
however, that Congress enacted § 323 as an integrated whole to vindicate the Government's
important interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption."); Spencer
Overton, Judicial Modesty and the Lessons of McConnell v. FEC, 3 ELECTION L.J. 305, 313
(2004) ("Campaign finance statutes often work 'as an integrated whole,' and a judge who
carelessly invalidates a minor provision might unwittingly poke a hole in the entire regulatory
structure."). Indeed, one might argue that many current problems stem from the Court's failure
to appreciate the structural nature of campaign finance in Buckley v. Valeo. By upholding
individual contribution limits but invalidating candidate spending limits the Court in Buckley
limited the supply of money but created an unlimited demand, thereby placing a premium on
large contributions. In a dissent in Nixon v. Shrink MissouriGovernment PAC Justice Kennedy
asserted that the Court's prior invalidation of spending limitations resulted in adverse,
unintended consequences, such as issue advocacy and soft money. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 409-10 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
132. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-59 (1976) (discussing and invalidating
restrictions on individual and candidate expenditure limits).
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these values. In the alternative, the Court might adopt a rational-basis standard
to review reforms. 133 Unlike nonjusticiability, rational-basis review might
allow the Court to invalidate laws that infringe
individual autonomy or entrench
34
incumbent politicians to a great extent.
Legislators, however, would likely enact statutes that favor incumbents to
different degrees to test judicial willingness to invalidate such laws. To many
legislators, the gains of tempering electoral competition probably outweigh the
embarrassment of voting for a law that a court invalidates as entrenching.
Further, the more often a court invalidates such legislation, the more complex
the process becomes for future courts to determine the appropriate boundaries
of legislative authority.
Further, neither nonjusticiability nor rational-basis review define which
regulations courts should subject to lesser scrutiny. How should a court treat a
135
regulation affecting money spent on a movie like Bowling for Columbine,
which examines America's obsession with guns and violence and was released
immediately before the 2002 midterm elections? How should a court treat
regulations of election-related speech by media outlets, including
endorsements, editorials, and news reports that discuss candidates or ballot
initiatives? Granted, courts engage in less-than-clear categorical line drawing
in classifying other forms of expression that are subject to greater regulation,
such as "commercial speech." 136 The vagueness in categorization, however,
diminishes the guidance afforded by the deference approach.
133. See Karlan, supra note 127, at 686-88 (describing the evolution of economic
substantive due process doctrine and suggesting that the adoption of a new standard for election
law cases may allow the Supreme Court to extricate itself from the campaign finance issue);
Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 SUP.CT. REv. 34, 38-39 (discussing the Court's options of nonjusticiability or
rational-basis review in relaxing its enforcement of economic substantive due process).
134. While entrenchment differs from discrimination and challengers differ from hippies,
gays, and the mentally retarded, the use of rational-basis review to invalidate statutes has often
occurred when the Court has believed that government decisions were enacted out of improper
motives designed to disadvantage a particular group. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635
(1996) (using rational-basis review to invalidate a state constitutional amendment that
prohibited any state or local government body from enacting a law that prohibited
discrimination based on homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (using rational-basis review to invalidate
zoning requirement that a group home for the mentally retarded obtain a special permit for
operation); USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (using rational-basis review to
invalidate restriction limiting food stamps to households in which all members were related,
observing that "a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group [hippies]
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest").
135. BOWLNG FOR COLUMBINE (United Artists 2002).
136. See Schauer & Pildes, supra note 126, at 1828 ("[T]he Supreme Court has relied on a
boundary between commercial advertising and other speech that is no more clear and
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B. Invalidation ofAll Reforms
On the other end of the spectrum, a doctrinal test that requires invalidation
of all reforms would provide greater guidance than does the existing
overbreadth doctrine. 37 Absolute invalidation prevents entrenchment-minded
legislators from skewing campaign finance regulations in order to retain their
power. It would allow individuals to engage freely in political activity without
fear of unintentionally violating obscure campaign regulations and facing
criminal penalties.
Unlike absolute deference to campaign reforms,
invalidation would not pose significant boundary problems. Courts would
strike down the electioneering provisions, the remainder of the Act, and other
campaign reforms along with other regulations of political speech.
Just as judicial deference overlooks democratic values, absolute
invalidation also ignores important values. The Court has reasoned that large
contributions and spending by corporations and unions pose the twin dangers of
corruption and the appearance of corruption. Further, undisclosed spending
and contributions might also allow for corruption and the appearance of
corruption. 138As explained in detail in Part V, corruption prevents democratic
deliberation, widespread participation, individual autonomy, and electoral
competition. An absolute right of business corporations to contribute and
spend unlimited and undisclosed amounts, for example, results in outcomes
based on covert political auctions rather than deliberation. It also minimizes
the influence of citizens over the political process and reduces the incentives of
many individuals to participate in democracy.
In summary, both judicial invalidation and judicial deference provide
guidance to judges while compromising other substantive democratic values.
To many, mutually exclusive binary choices, whether they involve judicial
invalidation or complete deference, seem overly simplistic and incomplete. To
these individuals, a well-functioning, participatory democracy does not exist at
either extreme but instead exists somewhere along the continuum between the
two poles.

impermeable than a putative boundary between electoral speech and other forms of political
speech.").
137. As discussed earlier, the heightened scrutiny applied to campaign reforms is not
"fatal-in-fact" because courts tolerate contribution limitations, disclosure requirements, and
limitations on spending by business corporations, unions, and many nonprofit corporations.
138. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,67 (1976) ("[D]isclosure requirements deter actual
corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and
expenditures to the light of publicity.").
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C. Content-BasedRules
The Court could provide guidance and avoid the extremes described above
by adopting a bright-line rule that limits regulation to spending on political
expression that contains specific words or references. In his separate dissent in
McConnell, for example, Justice Thomas interpreted Buckley to require that
"any regulation of political speech beyond communications using words of
express advocacy is unconstitutional." 3 9 In applying an express advocacy rule,
the Court would almost certainly find the electioneering provisions
unconstitutional because they regulate spending on speech that does not contain
express advocacy.
Just as the one-person, one-vote rule provided greater guidance in the
districting context,' 4 the express advocacy rule gives more direction than the
conventional overbreadth doctrine. In the words of Justice Thomas, "speech
containing the 'magic words' is 'unambiguously campaign related,' ... while
speech without these words is not."'14 1 The rule clearly notifies legislators of
their regulatory authority, which increases the likelihood that reforms will meet
constitutional requirements. The ease in administration streamlines judicial
decisionmaking and reduces concerns that judges will decide cases based on
personal political assumptions.
Granted, the express advocacy rule might require difficult judgments
regarding whether the advocate uses words that are synonymous with "vote for"

139. McConnell, 124 S.Ct. at 737 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that the express
advocacy test was adopted not merely to enhance the clarity of statutory language regulating
independent expenditures, but to narrow its coverage, and asserting that six of the seven circuits
that have considered the question have interpreted express advocacy as a constitutional rule).
Even aside from the broad scope of the electioneering provisions, Justice Thomas stated that,
unlike the other eight Justices, he would invalidate the disclosure requirements of the
electioneering provisions. He asserted that the interest in "providing 'information' about the
speaker to the public" does not outweigh the right to anonymous speech. McConnell, 124 S. Ct.
at 736 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
140. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) ("Judicial standards under the Equal
Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a
discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action."); see also ELY,
supra note 120, at 124 (explaining that the Court adopted aone-person, one-vote rule "precisely
because of considerations of administrability"); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 175 (2d ed., rev. vol. 2002)
(suggesting that "the one-person, one-vote rule based on strict population equality could be
readily managed by the courts and thus allowed ajusticiable standard for judicial immersion
into the 'political thicket' of elected institutions") (quoting Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725,
732 (1983)).
141. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 739 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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or "defeat" in particular contexts; thus, the rule is less mechanical than the oneperson, one-vote rule. 42 Nevertheless, by focusing only on magic words,
courts avoid thorny empirical questions that characterize the conventional
overbreadth doctrine-such as the projected number of regulated activities that
will not corrupt or appear to corrupt the political process. The rule also allows
of the most blatant attempts
for a consistent protection of speech and regulation
43
process.
political
the
corrupt
and
to influence
The express advocacy rule, however, sacrifices key governmental interests
related to preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption.' 44 There is
no good reason to believe that express words of advocacy like "vote for" or
"vote against" always or even usually threaten these state interests more than
communications that do not contain such words. 45 Campaign advertisements
without "express advocacy," for example, are often more politically effective,
as evidenced by the fact that only 10.4% of all candidate-sponsored
advertisements that aired during the 2000 federal election cycle used express

142. See Edward B. Foley, "Smith for Congress" and its Equivalents: An Enforcement
Test under Buckley and MCFL, 2 ELECTION L.J. 3 (discussing different interpretations of the
"express advocacy" standard, and arguing for an interpretation that is fairly clear-cut and
supportive of regulation); Glenn J. Moramarco, Magic Words and the Myth of Certainty, I
ELECTION L.J. 387, 398 (2002) (discussing the "practical difficulties that arise when one tries to
determine whether particular words, phrases, or images meet the Buckley and MCFL tests for
express advocacy").
143. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 740 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas states:
Buckley did not draw [the express advocacy] line solely to aid in combatting real or
apparent corruption, but rather also to ensure the protection of speech unrelated to
election campaigns .... [A]s "the distinction between discussion of issues and
candidates... may often dissolve in practical application," ... the only way to
prevent the unjustified burdening ofnonelection speech is to impose the regulation
only on speech that is "unambiguously campaign related," ... i.e., speech using
words of express advocacy.
Id.
144. The rule might also be said to sacrifice values related to informed political decisions
and the enforcement of campaign finance laws through disclosure of financial support:
[D]isclosure provides the electorate with information "as to where political
campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate" in order to aid
the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office ....[Further,] recordkeeping,
reporting, and disclosure requirements are an essential means of gathering the data
necessary to detect violations of the contribution limitations described above.
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68 (quoting H.R. REP No. 92-564, at 4 (1971)).
145.

Cf DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS INCONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INSTITUTIONAL

CORRUPTION 112 (The Brookings Institution, 1995) ("There is... no good reason to believe that
connections that are proximate and explicit are any more corrupt than connections that are
indirect and implicit.").
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advocacy. 146 By erring so heavily away from statutes that are overinclusive, the
judicial rule effectively mandates underinclusiveness by prohibiting legislatures
from responding to activity that poses a threat of corruption but does not
include express advocacy. It provides a safe harbor for corruption and thus
147
encourages shrewd and calculating political actors to engage in such activity.
The state's interests that are sacrificed by the express advocacy rule cannot be
minimized by a more measured interpretation of the test due to the rigidity of
the rule.
Some might propose that the Court restore prevention-of-corruption values
by expanding the boundaries of the judicial tool past express advocacy to
tolerate regulation of spending on any speech that refers to a federal candidate.
Absent any additional tools to determine overbreadth, this broaderjudicial tool
sacrifices values related to the protection of speech, such as prevention of
incumbent entrenchment and promotion of individual autonomy. Such a rule
would presumably tolerate the regulation of money spent on activities that pose
little threat of corruption, such as a 60 Minutes 48 newsmagazine interview of a
senator or a constituent's letter to her representative. Similarly, it prevents
legislative attempts to regulate corruptive spending on speech that does not
include a reference to a candidate. An oil company attempting to curry favor
with George W. Bush during the 2000 presidential election, for example, could
have run an ad attacking the honesty of Democrats without ever mentioning the
name of Al Gore.149
Content-based boundaries are inadequate because the corrupting potential
of money depends not merely upon what is said. It also depends upon contextspecific factors such as speaker identity, audience, extent of regulation, and

146. See CRAIG B. HOLMAN ET AL., BUYING TIME 2000: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE
2000 FEDERAL ELECTIONS 72, fig. 8-1 (2002) (showing that only 10.4% of all candidatesponsored advertisements that aired during the 2000 federal election cycle used the magic
words), availableat http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/download/buyingtime2000/chap
ter8.pdf.; JONATHAN S. KRASNO ET AL., BUYING TIME: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 1998
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 9 (2000) (stating that only 4% of all candidate-sponsored
advertisements that aired during the 1998 federal election cycle used the magic words).
147. The rule might also be said to confuse constitutionally prohibitable activity with
constitutionally protected activity, thereby enabling the rationalization of circumvention. Rather
than honestly admitting that only judicial policy protects their activity, political actors avoid
moral culpability by dressing their activity as a "right" protected by the First Amendment.
148. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast).
149. FEC regulations would likely exclude a party reference from the scope of the
electioneering provisions' coverage, unless the reference constituted an "unambiguous reference
to [a candidate's] status as a candidate such as 'the Democratic presidential nominee."' I I
C.F.R. § 100.29(b)(2) (2003).
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timing-who, where, how, and when.' 50 The Court's rulings reflect the
importance of context to a limited extent. For example, prior to McConnellthe
Court determined that corporate spending poses a greater threat of corruption
than spending by individuals.'5 ' Along similar lines, disclosure requirements
52
are less intrusive upon expressive interests than are spending limitations. 1
The jurisprudence of the mechanical, content-based, express advocacy
test, however, does not fully incorporate context-specific distinctions and
results in illogical outcomes. For example, a legislature could prohibit
spending on express advocacy by a corporation, but it could not require
disclosure of corporate spending on a slightly different advertisement that omits
express advocacy yet is clearly designed to influence the election and corrupt
the process. This focus on how spending on speech is regulated exposes the
shortcomings of a one-dimensional, content-based construction of the
boundaries of reform. One can make a strong argument that what type of
speech can be regulated should vary depending on how legislators propose to
regulate the money, who is using the money, and when and where the
expressive activity will take place.
D. A MultidimensionalRule
In light of the limitations of a content-based judicial rule, the Court might
adopt a rule that accounts for content, form of regulation, speaker identity,
timing, and audience. The electioneering provisions of the Act attempt to do
this statutorily, but the Court could adopt similar guidelines as the boundaries
of reform. Judges might interpret the electioneering provisions as the effective
boundaries of reform, much as plaintiffs and some earlier courts interpreted the
Court's express advocacy holding in Buckley as the boundary of legislative
authority. Following the Court's guidance in McConnell, judges might
presume constitutional those state statutes that are identical to the
electioneering provisions. Courts might also invalidate those statutes that are
more restrictive than the electioneering provisions. This de facto judicial test,
however, provides no guidance as to whether other types of reforms improperly
infringe on too much speech. Constitutional questions about low contribution
150. Why, or the intent of the speaker to corrupt the process, is relevant but is less useful
due to the difficulty that courts and legislatures face in discerning speaker intent in a
manageable manner that allows for effective regulation.
151. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 682 (1990) (discussing the
substantial risk of corruption posed by the vast wealth of corporations).
152. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976) (discussing the severe impact of
expenditure limits on protected political speech).
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limits or restrictions on political spending by nonprofit organizations that
receive minimal funds from business corporations, for example, remain
unanswered.
In addition, to the extent that courts emphasize the electioneering
provisions as a fixed boundary for the permissible scope of regulation, they
unjustifiably warp the evolution of legislative responses to corruption.' 5 3 Local
and state elections differ from federal elections. Democracy continuously
evolves based on legal, technological, and social changes in the distribution of
resources, in campaign methods, and in fundraising practices. A rigid judicial
rule impedes this growth, 54 mechanically substituting the Court's fixed
political judgment for the legislature's normal function of reviewing and
repairing obsolete statutes. 55 Courts only muddy the test5 6by adding additional
rules and exceptions to address context-specific issues.'
Further, distinctions between those who use statutes and judicial tests
might justify greater flexibility for judicial tests. Clear, rule-like statutes
benefit speakers. Such rules provide instant notice to citizens as to prohibited
and permissible activities. The legislature may periodically craft new brightline rules to respond to evolving campaign strategies, technologies, and
problems. In contrast, judicial tests are intended to provide guidance to
legislatures and judges for reviewing statutes and also to promote consistency
in decisions. Unlike lay speakers, judges and legislatures generally have legal
staff, law libraries, time, and other resources to help them interpret and apply
more sophisticated judicial tests. Granted, judicial review requires judges to
have a clearer understanding of the relevant democratic objectives and values
than that provided by the current overbreadth doctrine. Nevertheless, judicial
tests might become obsolete if crafted as simple, inflexible rules. The
153. See Sullivan, supra note 51, at 66 (noting the argument that rules "tend toward
obsolescence" whereas standards "are flexible and permit decisionmakers to adapt them to
changing circumstances over time").
154. Cf Fallon, supra note 125, at 62 (stating that "in shaping constitutional tests, the
Supreme Court must take account of empirical, predictive, and institutional considerations that
may vary from time to time").
155. See Brief for McConnell Intervenor-Defendants, supra note 29, at 61 (arguing that
"periodic statutory repair is a normal process-and the natural province of legislatures, not of
courts"); cf McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 643-54 (surveying the continuous process of enacting
campaign regulations in response to evolving threats money posed to democratic integrity); id.
at 706 ("We are under no illusion that BCRA will be the last congressional statement on the
matter. Money, like water, will always find an outlet. What problems will arise, and how
Congress will respond, are concerns for another day.").
156. Cf Rose, supra note 52, at 578-79 (noting that "over time, the straightforward
common law crystalline rules have been muddied repeatedly by exceptions and equitable
second-guessing").
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simplicity and inflexibility that characterize an ideal campaign finance statute
might prove detrimental when adopted as characteristics of a judicial tool.
V. Balancing Clearly Defined Values to Review CampaignReform
In contrast to a judicial rule, a balancing test would allow judges to
consider different values and respond to evolving and context-specific
campaign practices and reforms. This Part proposes, applies, and analyzes a
test that balances four values:
democratic deliberation, widespread
participation, individual autonomy, and electoral competition. To appreciate
fully the benefits of balancing values, however, it may be helpful to first
explore the inadequacies of other balancing tests.
One balancing test would define substantial overbreadth by a fixed
percentage of invalid applications of a statute relative to total applications. For
example, a ten percent overbreadth threshold would assume that the harms of
ten invalid applications are sufficiently weighty to offset any gains from ninety
valid applications. Context-specific factors associated with overbreadth,
however, evade quantification by a single fixed number. Different types of
regulations advance the state interest and infringe on expression to varying
degrees. For example, spending prohibitions are perceived to burden
expressive interests more than disclosure requirements. Therefore, a spending
prohibition in which ten percent of the applications were invalid might be more
troubling than a disclosure requirement in which ten percent of the applications
were invalid. Similarly, different applications of any single statute are often not
simply "invalid" or "valid," but advance the state's interest and infringe upon
expressive values to varying degrees. A numerical threshold such as ten
percent would fail to reflect the true harms and benefits of a particular statute.
Professor Richard Hasen, observing that numbers alone do not reveal
whether overbreadth is substantial, proposed that courts ultimately weigh "the
benefits that the legislation hopes to achieve" against the "costs of
overbreadth."57 Along similar lines, Justice Breyer has suggested that courts
157. Hasen, supra note 45, at 1801. Hasennotes:
[T]he answer to the overbreadth question for regulating sham issue advocacy
depends not only on the percentage of genuine issue advertisements captured but
also on the benefits that the legislation hopes to achieve compared to the costs of
requiring corporations and unions wishing to run genuine issue ads to do so only
through a separate PAC.
Hasen, supra note 72. Hasen's proposal draws upon that of Professor Richard Fallon, who
suggested that courts applying overbreadth doctrine ultimately balance:
(a) the state's substantive interest in being able to impose sanctions for a particular
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reviewing campaign finance regulations ask "whether the statute burdens any
one such [constitutionally protected] interest in a manner out of proportion to
the statute's salutary effects upon the others." "8' The flexibility of Hasen's and

Breyer's tests would likely allow courts to respond to evolving and contextspecific political activities and regulations.
Although Hasen's and Breyer's approaches seem right in principle, they
provide minimal guidance because they inadequately define the benefits and
the costs.' 59 Judges predisposed against reform will likely see great harm in a
statute that chills even a small number of expressive activities that do not pose
threats of corruption. They may not appreciate the extent to which a statute
advances a vague objective like "the prevention of corruption." Judges
predisposed in favor of reform will likely have different understandings of the
160
relevant values, and thus might arrive at an opposite conclusion.
Perfect solutions that provide mechanical guidance, respect all relevant
democratic values, and allow courts to respond to context-specific factors might

not exist. A balancing test that provides more guidance, however, would
advance these variables more than the alternatives. One way to enhance
guidance would be to further develop the specific values that campaign
activities and regulations should promote. For example, although the Court has
accepted prevention of corruption as a compelling state interest, it has failed to
clearly develop the values promoted by this interest.' 6' Similarly, the Court has
kind of conduct under a particular legal standard, as opposed to being forced to rely
on other, less restrictive substitutes against (b) the First Amendment interest in
encouraging narrow statutes and avoiding as much as possible the chilling of
constitutionally protected conduct.
Fallon, supra note 38, at 894.
158. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring);
see also Jerome Barron, The ElectronicMedia and the FlightFrom FirstAmendment Doctrine:
Justice Brewer's New Balancing Approach, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 817, 821 (1998)
(discussing the merits of Justice Breyer's balancing approach vis-6-vis First Amendment tests).
159. Indeed, Professor Hasen recognizes the lack of clarity that comes from his proposal,
and notes that his "[e]ssay is not the place to explore all of these questions in detail, which go to
the heart of the debate over modem campaign finance regulation." Hasen, supra note 45, at
1804.
160. The conflicting opinions in McConnell illustrate the indeterminacy of such balancing.
The Stevens/O'Connor majority opinion and the Kennedy dissent both avoided a discussion on
the precise proportion of protected activities that would be covered by the electioneering
provisions. Instead, the Stevens/O'Connor opinion seemed to conclude that the benefits of
restricting corporate and union spending to influence political campaigns outweighed the costs
of restricting speech unrelated to campaigns. The Kennedy dissent came to the opposite
conclusion.
161. See Frank J. Sorauf, Caught in a Political Thicket: The Supreme Court and
Campaign Finance,3 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 103 (1986) (observing that although the phrase
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not fully articulated the democratic values that judicial protection of the use of
money to support political candidates is intended to promote.
Without a concrete understanding of such values, judges are likely to
justify their conclusions using abstract terms like "free speech" or "prevention
of corruption" without a meaningful explanation as to when these concepts
should be limited. By fleshing out relevant values and painting a more
coherent vision of democracy, the Court would provide additional
guidance to
62
lower courts, to legislatures, and to itself in future cases. 1
This Part elaborates upon four democratic values inherent in the Justices'
approaches to campaign finance cases: democratic deliberation, widespread
participation, individual autonomy, and electoral competition. A court would
invalidate a campaign reform that, on the whole, detracts from these values
more than it advances them. Granted, even with such a test, political
assumptions may influence judicial decisionmaking. As discussed in further
detail below, greater transparency in the accounting of the political values at
stake allows for a more coherent doctrine than that afforded by a conventional
overbreadth approach, and more flexibility than bright-line judicial rules.
A. FourDemocratic Values
Campaign regulation and expressive activities implicate four democratic
values: democratic deliberation, widespread participation, individual autonomy,
and electoral competition. As evidenced below, different Justices have alluded to
these values in both supporting and opposing campaign regulation. This
Subpart culls the values from the Justices' opinions in McConnell and other
campaign finance cases and more clearly articulates them. Individuals will
likely dispute the primacy of these four values. Some might favor alternative
values; others might note that aspects of the values overlap,'6 3 or they might
describe or categorize the values differently. 64 Whatever one thinks of these
prevention of corruption "has a ring that most Americans will like ... its apparent clarity is
deceptive, and its origin is at best clouded").
162. See Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of PoliticalParties: A
Reassessment of CompetingParadigms,100 COLIJM. L. REv. 775, 796 (2000) (arguing that "an
emphasis on principles... might bring some sense and could help foster some predictability" to
election law).
163. The values intersect in many different ways. For example, widespread participation
provides diverse perspectives that allow enhanced democratic deliberation. Participation is
most effective in competitive races when vulnerable candidates must respond to citizens.
Participation and individual autonomy are both justified, in part, on the grounds of citizen selffulfillment.
164. The values are not presented in the form of a conventional Republican, Pluralist, or
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specific values suggested by the Justices, the central objective is to illustrate
that a more explicit acknowledgment and detailed articulation of democratic
values will allow for greater understanding and coherence of campaign finance
doctrine.
1. DemocraticDeliberation
The state's interest in preventing corruption is intended, in part, to
promote democratic deliberation. The Court's discussions of prevention of
corruption presume the existence of a deliberative norm from which
officeholders may stray. 165 Corruption, according to the Court, consists not just
of"quid pro quo agreements," but also of"undue influence on an officeholder's
judgment"166 or the threat of "politicians too compliant with the wishes of large
contributors."' 167 In McConnell, the Stevens/O'Connor opinion expressed
concern that large contributions would prevent officeholders
would prevent
' 68
officeholders from deciding issues "on the merits."'
The Court has also acknowledged a deliberative norm among the citizenry.
In Austin v. Michigan Chamberof Commerce,169 the Court defined corruption
as the use of immense wealth acquired through state-created advantages to
distort political debate to such a degree that it does not reflect the public's
support for ideas. 170 In another example, the Court acknowledged that
Descriptive theory of democracy, although elements of all three can be found in considering the
values.
165. See, e.g., Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruptionin Campaign Finance Law,
14 CONST. COMMENT. 127, 128 (1997) ("In order to employ the concept of corruption ... one
must have some underlying notion of the pure, original or natural state of the body politic."); cf
Joseph S. Nye, CorruptionandPoliticalDevelopment: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, in POLITICAL
CORRUPTION 963,966 (Heidenheimer et al. eds., 1989) (defining corruption as "behavior which

deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close
family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain
types of private-regarding influence").

166. FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431,441 (2001).
167. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). While the Court in
McConnell recognized that the interest in preventing corruption extends past "cash-for-votes
corruption to curbing 'undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, and the appearance of
such influence,"' it also noted that "mere political favoritism or opportunity for influence alone
is insufficient to justify regulation." McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 664, 666.
168. See McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 666.

169. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
170. See id. at 660 ("Corporate wealth can unfairly influence elections when it isdeployed
in the form of independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise of political
contributions."); United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957) (observing that the objective
of the prohibition on corporate political contributions "was not merely to prevent the subversion

JUDICIAL RE VIEW OF CAMPAIGN REFORM
disclosure requirements provide "the electorate with information 'as to where
political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate'
in
17 1
order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office."'
Spending on speech may also be said to facilitate deliberation. In striking
down spending restrictions, the Court in Buckley reasoned that a "restriction on
the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication
during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of
the audience reached."' 172 The Kennedy dissent in McConnell called for
invalidation of the provisions restricting electioneering spending by
corporations, unions, and many nonprofits because of the "dynamic
contribution diverse groups and associations make to the intellectual and
cultural life of the Nation."'173 Justice Thomas would invalidate contribution
limits because they infringe upon "the distinct role of candidate organizations
74
as a means of individual participation in the Nation's civic dialogue."
Despite conflicting assumptions about the role of regulation in advancing
democratic deliberation, the Justices have not fleshed out the meaning of
deliberation. "Deliberativepolitics connotes an argumentative interchange
among persons who recognize each other as equal in authority and entitlement
to respect. . ... 75 Deliberation does not simply allow for the discovery of preexisting valid results, but allows for results that citizens consider valid due to
the legitimacy of the deliberative process. 1 76 A variety of tools facilitate
"

of the integrity of the electoral process" but also "to sustain the active, alert responsibility of the
individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of government").
171. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976).
172. Id. at 19.
173. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 772 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 417 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also James Madison, Report on
the Resolutions (1799-1800), in 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 397 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906)
(noting that democracy depends on the freedom of "examining and discussing [the] merits and
demerits of the candidates").
175. Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
Argument: The Case of PornographyRegulation, 56 TENN. L. REv. 291, 293 (1989).
176. Cf BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW
AGE 167 (1984) ("[W]here politics is the preeminent domain of things public (res publica),
political knowledge is communal and consensual rather than either subjective (the product of
private senses or of private reason) or objective (existing independently of individual wills).");
JoHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 121-23 (1920) (illustrating a change in science
from valuing theoretical knowledge to experimental knowledge as an example of the process
defining the result); RICHARD RORTY, PIRLOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 170-71(1979)
(observing that "[i]f we see knowledge as a matter of conversation and social practice, rather
than as an attempt to mirror nature," we develop a philosophy separated from the quest for
certainty); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619,
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deliberation, including but not limited to legislative hearings,
letters to
177
newspaper editors, campaign materials, and town hall meetings.
Although most people are never completely removed from their own
interests and experiences, 17 deliberative democracy aspires to focus on reason
and argument rather than on strategic bargaining or coercion in collective
decisionmaking. 179 The failure to consider a wide, representative range of
views sacrifices deliberation." 0 This might occur when one uses contributions
or spending to coerce a government official into making a decision. It might
also occur when a disproportionately larger percentage of an elected official's
time is spent with wealthier financial supporters than with those who have

2634 (1995) (describing that private adjudicative disputes achieve validity because they
exemplify the application of the law, which is a visible residue of public action); Bernard
Manin, On Legitimacy and PoliticalDeliberation, 15 POL. THEORY 338, 351-52 (Elly Stein &
Jane Mansbridge trans., 1987) (arguing that "the source of legitimacy is not the predetermined
will of individuals, but rather the process of its formation, that is, deliberation itself').
177. Other examples include citizen and expert testimony, committee reports, public
statements, campaigning, exchanges with lobbyists and constituents, petition signing, Weblogs,
Websites, letters to government officials, membership in political parties or public interest
groups, handbills, leaflets, speeches, debates, news appearances, and television and radio
advertisements.
178. See Richard A. Primus, When Democracy is Not Self-Government: Towarda Defense
of the Unanimity Rulefor CriminalJuries, 18 CARDOzO L. REv. 1417, 1449 (1997) (asserting
that "people never stand completely outside their personalities, class backgrounds, levels of
education, and so on").
179. See Thomas Jefferson, First Annual Message (Dec. 8, 1801), in THE LIFE AND
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 325, 331 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds.,
1944) ("The prudence and temperance of your discussions will promote, within your own walls,
that conciliation which so much befriends rational conclusion; and by its example will
encourage among our constituents that progress of opinion which is tending to unite them in
object and in will."); JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITMATION CRISIS I 10 (Thomas McCarthy trans.,
1975) (examining the effects of using practical deliberation rather than force); THE FEDERALIST
No. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[T]he causes of faction cannot be
removed and ... relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects."); Michelman,
supra note 175, at 293 (describing that the "deliberative medium is a good faith exchange of
views... in which all participants remain open to the possibility of persuasion by others"); Cass
R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1544 (1988) ("Under
republican approaches to politics, laws must be supported by argument and reasons; they cannot
simply be fought for or be the product of self-interested 'deals."').
180. Cf.Thomas 1.Emerson, Toward a GeneralTheory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 881 (1963) (listing one of the values of speech as "attainment of truth" acquired "by
considering all facts and arguments which can be put forth in behalf of or against any
proposition"). Widespread participation and honest consideration of different perspectives is
especially important to democratic deliberation in light of criticisms that an overemphasis on
"reasoning" favors educated elites and an aspiration of a single "common good" ignores the
diversity of society.
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fewer resources.' 8' Business corporations can contribute important information
toward deliberation. The charters of many corporations, however, limit the
objectives of such entities to making money for the shareholders. While this
goal may sometimes overlap with the common good, the objectives are not
coterminous.

2. WidespreadParticipation
The Court has suggested that the prevention of an appearance of
corruption preserves citizen participation. In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, for example, the Court stated that preventing the appearance
of corruption was important because "the cynical assumption that large donors
call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in
democratic governance."'' 82 In McConnell, the Court stated that contribution
limits "require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater
number of persons" and "tangibly benefit public participation in political
debate."' 83

On the other hand, complex campaign regulations of grassroots activity
might hinder widespread participation.
For example, the Court has
acknowledged that disclosure requirements of contributions as low as ten
dollars "may well discourage participation by some citizens in the political
process."' 84 In a similar vein, Justice Thomas has stated that contribution

181. See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why
CampaignSpending Limits May Not Violate the FirstAmendment AfterAll, 94 COLUM. L. REv.
1281, 1283 (1994) ("If the candidate is not substantially free.., to spend her time
considering.. . the grievances, information, and ideas of non-donors... the process falls short,
not just of the ideal but of the constitutional norm.").
182. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000); see id. at 401 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (writing that campaign finance restrictions seek to "build public confidence in [the
democratic] process and broaden the base of a candidate's meaningful financial support,
encouraging the public participation and open discussion that the First Amendment itself
presupposes") (citing A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
24-27 (1948)); FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982) (finding that the
interests of preventing both actual corruption and the appearance of corruption "directly
implicate 'the integrity of our electoral process, and, not less, the responsibility of the individual
citizen for the successful functioning of that process"').
183. McConnell, 124 S.Ct. at. at 656; see also Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic
Constitution,77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 245, 253 (2002) (observing that campaign finance laws seek to
"democratize the influence that money can bring to bear upon the electoral process, thereby
building public confidence in that process, broadening the base of a candidate's meaningful
financial support, and encouraging greater public participation").
184. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,83 (1976).
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restrictions relegate individuals'
attempts to participate to less effective and less
85
convenient methods.1

Scholars have defined citizen participation as "purposeful activities in
which citizens take part in relation to government."' 8 6 Participation is a crucial
democratic value. As Justice Brandeis remarked, "the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people."'81 7 Participation includes, but is not limited to
voting;18 8 involvement or financial support of a campaign, political party, issue,
or interest group; public advocacy and protest; and absorbing news about
public affairs. 8 9
Widespread participation serves four primary functions. First, it exposes
decision-makers to a variety of ideas and viewpoints, which ensures fully
informed decisions.' 90 Second, it enhances the legitimacy of government
decisions, which increases the likelihood that citizens will voluntarily comply
with such decisions.' 9 ' Third, widespread participation allows for a
185. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 417-18 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that restrictions result
inthe "suppression of political speech" and "relegate donors' points of view to less effective
modes of communication").
186. Stuart Langton, What is Citizen Participation?,in CIIZEN PARTICIPATION INAMERICA
13, 17 (Stuart Langton ed., 1978). See generally CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND
DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970) (presenting essays on the nature and value of public participation
inthe democratic process); PARTICIPATIONIN POLITICS: NoMosXVI (J. Roland Pennock & John
W.

Chapman eds., 1975) (same); THE CASE FOR PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY (C. George

Benello & Dimitrios Roussopoulos eds., 1971) (same).
187. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
188. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American PublicLaw, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29,
31 (1985) (asserting that the early Republican conception of political participation included
deliberative dialogue and debate, and was not limited simply to the act of voting). But see John
H. Aldrich, Rational Choice and Turnout, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 246, 246 (1993) (stating that
"turning out to vote is the most common and important act of political participation in any

democracy").
189. See JAMES BURKHART ET AL., STRATEGIES FOR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 41 (1972)
(providing examples of participation in information gathering and opinion forming); MARY
GRISEZ KWEIT& ROBERT W. KWEIT, IMPLEMENTING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN A BUREAUCRATIC

SOCIETY: A CONTINGENCY APPROACH 54-60 (1981) (providing examples of citizen
participation); Langton, supra note 186, at 21-23 (same).
190. See Walter A. Rosenbaum, Public Involvement as Reform and Ritual: The
Development ofFederalParticipationPrograms,in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION INAMERICA 81, 87
(Stuart Langton ed., 1978) ("Many commentators favor public involvement because it can
reduce administrative freedom to make decisions from narrowly professional bureaucratic of
self-interested motivations."); Nancy Perkins Spyke, Public Participationin Environmental
Decisionmakingat the New Millennium: StructuringNew Spheres of PublicInfluence, 26 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 263,267-68 (1999) ("Widespread participation exposes decisionmakers to
a healthy mix of perspectives, which is believed to improve the decisionmaking process.").
191. See KWEIT & KWEIT, supra note 189, at 132 (presenting the hypothesis that "[t]he
more satisfied the citizens are with participation, the more trusting and efficacious they will
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redistribution of government resources and priorities to reflect evolving
problems and needs.1 92 Finally, participation furthers self-fulfillment and selfdefinition of individual citizens who play a role in shaping the decisions that
impact their lives. 93 These functions suggest that as many natural persons as
possible, or at least as many citizens as possible, should have access to the
instrumentalities of participation. While corporate participation might expose
decision-makers to additional ideas and viewpoints, self-fulfillment and other
functions of participation seem uniquely applicable to natural persons.
To the extent that vast disparities exist in the instrumentalities of
participation, citizens might feel less able to shape the decisions that impact
their lives and may question the legitimacy of the laws. 194 Formal equality of
some instrumentalities of participation, such as voting, is appropriate. Uniform
equality of other instrumentalities, however, is sometimes inconsistent with
widespread participation. 95 Precise equality fails to appreciate that excessive
restrictions can deaden political participation to the detriment of society as a
whole. For example, a complete prohibition on the use of private funds for
political purposes would outlaw even the purchase of a poster board to make a
sign criticizing the government. By tying the use of instrumentalities of
participation to fixed and inflexible principles, mechanical equality aspires to a
be"); Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Emptiness of Majority Rule, I MICH. J. RACE & L. 195, 201
(1996) ("To deserve the democratic denomination, the people must take part in political
affairs.").
192. See KWEIT & KWEIT, supra note 189, at 162 (asserting that the goals of public
participation include the redistribution of power).
193. See Frank 1. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REv. 443, 451 (1989) (discussing a "constitutive" vision
of politics whereby citizens define themselves through their participation); see also C.B.
MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LmERAL DEMOCRACY 47-48, 51-52 (1977) (asserting that
public participation increases "the amount of personal self-development of all the members of
society").
194. According to James A. Gardner:
Generally, participation is most meaningful when it is a means by which citizens
can play a significant role in shaping the decisions that affect their lives. For this
condition to hold, citizens must feel that there is some reasonable prospect for their
participation to lead eventually to actions that affect them.
James A. Gardner, One Person, One Vote and the PossibilityofPoliticalCommunity, 80 N.C.
L. REv. 1237, 1247 (2002) (footnote omitted).
195. See RONALD DwoRKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 198 (2000) (distinguishing between
equality of deliberation, or "influence," and decisionmaking, and arguing that "equality of
influence is incompatible, even in principle, with other attractive aspects of an egalitarian
society"); Andrei Marmor, Authority, Equality and Democracy 18 (Jan. 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, at http://lawweb.usc.edu/cleo/working-papers/olin/documents/03_1 5_paper.pdf
(asserting that "a principle of equality need not be the same kind of equality with respect to
these two main stages of the political process, namely, deliberation and decision").
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mathematical certainty that is inconsistent with fair and practical
implementation in many areas other than voting. The democratic value of
widespread participation is not synonymous with dull uniformity.
3. IndividualAutonomy
Individual autonomy is an important principle generally undergirding
expression. In emphasizing a form of individual autonomy that stems from
freedom from government restriction, Justice Thomas wrote:
Even if contributions to a candidate were not the most effective means of
speaking.., an individual's choice of that mode of expression would still
be protected. .. . Buckley completely failed in its attempt to provide a
basis for permitting government to second-guess the individual choices of
citizens partaking in quintessentially democratic activities ....[T]he right
to free peech is a right held by each American, not by Americans en
masse.

On the other hand, campaign regulation that prevents corruption has been
described as implicating "the responsibility of the individual citizen for the
successful functioning" of the electoral process. 97 A contested concept with
multiple meanings, individual autonomy requires further development to be
useful in the campaign finance context. 98
Perhaps the most familiar concept of individual autonomy stems from an
individual's freedom from government interference in doing or determining
what she wants. 99 To achieve self-realization, the mind must be free. Selfexpression is perceived as an "integral part of the development of ideas, of
mental exploration, and of the affirmation of self., 200 Government suppression
of such thoughts is an affront to one's individual dignity.'O
196. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,417 n.5, 418,420 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
197. United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957).
198. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REv. 875, 876
(1994) ("Autonomy, however, is a protean concept, which means different things to different
people, and occasionally appears to change its meaning in the course of a single argument.")
(footnote omitted).
199, See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts ofLiberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 122-31
(1969) (describing the notion of negative freedom).
200. THOMAS 1.EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5
(1967); see MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 11 (1984)
("[Tihe constitutional guarantee of free speech ultimately serves only one true value,...
'individual self-realization.'').
201. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970) ("For the
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Individual autonomy involves choice-"a right [of individuals] to make
important decisions defining their own lives for themselves. 20 2 Autonomy
means "having a say in what affects you," including how one is governed.20 3
The extent to which a person exercises this choice, however, does not depend
upon mere government action or inaction. Other variables are relevant,
including one's personal talents, access to resources, and the actions of other
nongovernmental actors. Autonomy also requires "freedom from coercion,
manipulation, and temporary distortion of judgment, 20 4 and the existence of
meaningful alternatives from which to choose. 20 5 Government activity or
restriction-such funding that enables additional choices or restrictions on
coercive behavior-can therefore enhance the autonomy of a particular
individual.
Any action to expand autonomy by government or other entities, however,
requires judgments about resources, coercion, and options that are external to
the individual. Such judgments can be said to paternalistically compromise a
person's autonomy by attributing her successes and failures to factors external
to herself.20 6 Others, however, see this paternalism argument as rhetoric
designed to preserve the status quo and prevent widespread access to
achievement of this self-realization the mind must be free. Hence suppression of belief,
opinion, or other expression is an affront to the dignity of man, a negation of man's essential
nature."); LAURENCE H.TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-I, at 787 (2d ed. 1988)
(explaining that "much of our commitment to freedom of speech" stems from the belief that
"political participation is valuable in part because it enhances personal growth and selfrealization"). But see OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 83 (1996) (noting that "[t]he
autonomy protected by the First Amendment and rightly enjoyed by individuals and the press is
not an end in itself, as it might be in some moral code, but is rather a means to further the
democratic values underlying the Bill of Rights").
202. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 222 (1993); see CASS R. SUNsTEIN, DEMOCRACY
AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 138 (1995) (noting that autonomy can be defined as
permitting or empowering individuals to be "authors of the narratives of their own lives").
203. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term: Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 75 (1989) (defining individual autonomy as "the
importance of each individual having a say in how he or she is governed"); Michael H. Shapiro,
Judicial Selection and the Design of Clumsy Institutions, 61 S.CAL. L. REv. 1555, 1567 n.48
(1988) ("'Autonomy,' as used in the text, refers to that aspect of autonomy dealing with
opportunities to pursue preferences-an ability generally enhanced by having a say in what
affects you.").
204. Fallon, supra note 198, at 877.
205. See JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 373-77 (1986) (explaining that without
an adequate range of options, one does not enjoy an autonomous life).
206. Cf Fallon, supra note 198, at 878 ("Employed as an ascriptive concept, autonomy
represents the purported metaphysical foundation of people's capacity and also their right to
make and act on their own decisions, even if those decisions are ill-considered or substantively
unwise.").
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substantive autonomy. It seems possible to consider the substantive, relative
aspects of autonomy as long as they do not overshadow the intimate, personal,
self-determinative nature of the concept. A significant difference exists, for
example, between a sixty-day restriction on corporate spending on broadcast
ads and a government requirement that the government itself own and program
all media outlets. In light of the self-realization values undergirding autonomy,
the concept seems uniquely applicable to natural persons. Restrictions on
corporations, however, might diminish the autonomy of potential listeners by
eliminating the option to hear corporate-sponsored speech.2 °7
4. Electoral Competition
Many Justices on the Court have expressed concern that incumbent
politicians will design reforms to keep themselves in power and disadvantage
challengers. 0 8 In the words of Justice Scalia, "[t]he incumbent politician who
says he welcomes full and fair debate is no more to be believed than the
entrenched monopolist who says he welcomes full and fair competition. ' 2° 9 In
207. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (invalidating restrictions on
corporate spending on ballot measures, asserting that "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source,
whether corporation, association, union, or individual").
208. The dissenting opinions in McConnell expressed concerns about the entrenching
effects of the Act. See McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 721 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) ("[A]ny restriction upon a type of campaign speech that is equally available to challengers
concurring in part,
and incumbents tends to favor incumbents."); id. at 753-54 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting in part) ("Name recognition and other advantages held by incumbents ensure that as a
general rule incumbents will be advantaged by the legislation the Court today upholds.").
Indeed, the Stevens/O'Connor opinion in McConnell was too quick to dismiss dangers that
lawmakers passed the Act to preserve their own political power. The Stevens/O'Connor
majority opinion addressed this issue with two sentences:
Any concern that Congress might opportunistically pass campaign-finance
regulation for self-serving ends is taken into account by the applicable level of
scrutiny. Congress must show concrete evidence that a particular type of financial
transaction is corrupting or gives rise to the appearance of corruption and that the
chosen means of regulation are closely drawn to address that real or apparent
corruption.
Id. at 684 n.72.
The Court's application of a generic "closely drawn to prevent corruption" test, however,
does not take into account the threat of incumbent entrenchment. Lawmakers may craft a
regulation, for example, that both prevents corruption and entrenches incumbents. Recognizing
that a primary purpose of the First Amendment is to prevent elected officials from enacting laws
that prevent criticism of government, the Court in McConnell should have provided a more
meaningful discussion of the competing dangers of entrenchment and corruption.
209. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 692 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
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contrast, reformers have argued that the ability of the wealthy to contribute and
spend large sums on behalf of incumbent lawmakers undermines the
competitiveness of elections and ensures that2 1government
officials are not
0
responsive to the concerns of most Americans.
Electoral competition means that insurgents challenge incumbents,
candidates actively pursue voter support, incumbents face a real possibility of
losing, and voters have meaningful choices.21'The electorate can "only express
a 'free and uncorrupted choice' if it has the ability to select among competing
political prospects. 21 2 The primary purpose of electoral competition is to
produce government officials and policy outcomes that are responsive to the
interests of citizens. 2 3 Absent competition, elected officials lack incentives to
respond to evolving problems and opportunities.1 4 Competition puts a check
on the power of government officials who might otherwise enact or tolerate

dissenting); see Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 404 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("[W]e should not defer in respect to whether its solution, by imposing too low a
contribution limit, significantly increases the reputation-related or media-related advantages of
incumbency and thereby insulates legislators from effective electoral challenge."); Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 644 n.9 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that judicial deference to campaign reforms
"amounts to letting the fox stand watch over the henhouse").
210. See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 4, at 301 ("The systemic degradation of the political
influence of the nonaffiluent is best witnessed by government policy. Congress is far more
responsive to the political interests of the wealthy than the poor, and often acts to the detriment
of those who do not participate in the wealth primary.").
211. See Richard Briffault, The FutureofReform: CampaignFinanceAfter the Bipartisan
CampaignReform Act of2002, 34 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1179, 1212 (2002) (describing the problem of

inadequate funding for challengers who face well-funded incumbents and its negative effects on
informed voter decisionmaking); Nathaniel Persily, Candidatesv. Parties: The Constitutional
Constraintson PrimaryBallot Access Laws, 89 GEO. L.J. 2181, 2190 (2001) (defining electoral

competitiveness as, at a minimum, "the ability of elections to present contests to the voters in
which the winners are not predetermined"). Electoral competitiveness is distinct from the
competitive marketplace of ideas metaphor used to justify judicial protection of speech from
regulation. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas ... the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market .... ").
212. Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymanderingand PoliticalCartels, 116 HARv. L. REv. 593,

615 (2002).

213. See lssacharoff & Pildes, supra note 118, at 646 ("Only through an appropriately
competitive partisan environment can one of the central goals of democratic politics be realized:
that the policy outcomes of the political process be responsive to the .interests and views of
citizens.").
214. See Issacharoff, supra note 212, at 600 ("Viewed differently, however, this form of
political market manipulation threatens a core tenet ofdemocratic legitimacy: accountability to
shifting voter preferences.").
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abusive practices."'
This accountability to the electorate ensures democratic
216
legitimacy.

When incumbent responsiveness to the needs of a majority of constituents
creates a lack of competition, little cause for concern exists. The process
malfunctions, however, when incumbents diminish competition not by
responding to a majority of the electorate, but by using the power of office to
manipulate campaign rules or to acquire other special advantages over
challengers.2 17 While reforms could in principle enhance competition, in reality
incumbents aspire to preserve their power. Therefore, a court should aspire to
ensure that reforms do not, on the whole, diminish competition.
B. Institutionsand EmpiricalInquiries
Even if the Court adopted the four democratic values, thorny empirical
issues remain. This Subpart identifies fact-finding challenges unique tojudicial
review of campaign finance regulations. It also proposes an evidentiary
standard and lists some types of evidence that courts should consider when
reviewing campaign reforms.
Judicial speculation about political effects differs from the traditional
judicial fact-finding role. In most cases, judges feel comfortable with their
ability to predict the effects of activities and statutes. In the campaign finance
context, unanticipated political consequences abound and judges face
difficulties in predicting the extent to which reforms like the electioneering
provisions will further state interests.
215. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 5 1, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("A
dependence on the people is no doubt the primary controul [sic] on the government .... ").
216. See DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: ACRITIQUEOFCONSENTTHEORY 205-07 (1989)
(identifying responsiveness "as the core of a theory of legitimacy"); HANNA FENICHEL PIrKIN,
THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 232 (1967) (arguing that a "representative government must
not merely be in control, not merely promote the public interest, but must also be responsive to
the people"). Note that some defend anticompetitive practices as furthering democratic stability
and avoiding factionalism. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) (upholding
various California restrictions on ballot access due to a state interest in political stability, and
stating that "California apparently believes with the Founding Fathers that splintered parties and
unrestrained factionalism may do significant damage to the fabric of government").
217. See Michael J.Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem,
85 GEO. L.J. 491,498 (1997) (describing legislative entrenchment and stating that "the desire of
representatives to perpetuate their hold on office may induce them to act contrary to the
preferences of their constituents on a variety of issues"); Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of
PoliticalCompetition, 85 VA. L. REv. 1605, 1611 (1999) ("Democratic systems are subject to
certain characteristic manipulations; we seek to identify those dangers and suggest the need for
some external institution or legal rule structures to counteract these tendencies.").
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Even with the benefit of hindsight, campaign finance determinations differ
from more ascertainable questions, such as "was the defendant at the scene of
the crime? 21 8 For example, how does a defendant establish that money unduly
influenced deliberations on a large number of bills?

219

This question has no

definitive answer. Relevant variables include the merits of each bill, alternative
proposals, and the influence of monetary factors relative to nonmonetary factors
in the passage of each bill. No static, controlled set of variables exists that
allows the isolation and mathematical determination of the influence 22of
one
0
causal factor like corporate and union spending on electioneering ads.
Courts should not invalidate reforms simply because defendants cannot
establish their effects with absolute certainty. This indefiniteness might stem
from the practical difficulty in obtaining definitive answers to questions of a
political nature rather than from a lack ofjustification for the reform. If courts
are to engage in meaningful review rather than mechanical invalidation of
reforms, the inability to measure political effects with mathematical precision
cannot, by itself, jeopardize the regulation.
The unique nature of campaign finance fact-finding raises the question of
whether judges should defer to the legislative record in the campaign finance
context.2 Judges traditionally consider cases involving individual harms, and
they might possess expertise in assessing facts regarding individual autonomy.
Legislators, however, seem best positioned to assess the effects of money and
regulations upon deliberation. Due to their experience as candidates, legislators
also possess the most expertise to determine the effects of money and campaign
regulations on widespread participation and electoral competition.
218. See Sorauf, supra note 161, at 10 (explaining the problems of definition and prooffacing determinations of "improper" or "excessive" influence within campaigns).
219. Similar problems confront fact-finding related to other values. For example, how can
aplaintiff establish conclusively that the electioneering provisions, if implemented, will dampen
competition by advantaging incumbents and disadvantaging challengers? How can adefendant
show definitively that more citizens will participate in politics once the electioneering
provisions are enacted?
220. A fact finder, one might argue, could engage in acomparative analysis of the thought
process of every legislator regarding every piece of legislation considered, and enter into a
complex "but for" analysis about which bills would have passed. Even in the unlikely event that
one could practically engage in such a survey, the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution
might prohibit members from being questioned about the motivations for their legislative acts.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. I ("[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [Members of
Congress] shall not be questioned in any other Place."); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 503 (1969) (stating that the Speech and Debate Clause ensures "that legislators are
free to represent the interests of their constituents without fear that they will be later called to
task in the courts for that representation").
221. Cf Richardson, supra note 107, at 31 (examining the problems inherent in judicial
review of speech prohibition laws).
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Complete judicial deference to legislative fact-finding regarding any single
value would hamper judicial review. Simply by beefing up the legislative
record with findings that a regulation enhances deliberation, participation,
autonomy, and competition, Congress could enact laws effectively immune
from judicial review. 222 Incumbents' incentives to pass reforms that insulate
themselves from challengers make this especially problematic.223
The doctrine provides few answers to fact-finding problems. While the
Court requires an evidentiary showing of corruption to justify campaign
restrictions, 224 its standards are unclear. In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, the Court stated that "[w]e have never accepted mere
conjecture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden" '25 but that "[t]he
quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of
legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of
thejustification raised. 2 26 The method by which a court determines novelty or
plausibility remains unclear.
222. Cf Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(asserting that "the enactment of the statute cannot alone establish the facts which are essential
to its validity").
223. See ELY, supra note 120, at 106 (noting that incumbents, as "ins[,] have a way of
wanting to make sure that outs stay out"); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and
Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. REv. 949, 961 (1995) ("Rent-seeking incumbents unfettered by
term limits might stand united on one principle: suppress information or controversy that might
lead voters to drive them from office."); cf New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964) ("Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, [the founders] amended
the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.") (quoting Whitney,
274 U.S. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring)); Klarman, supra note 217, at 498 (describing the
phenomenon of a temporary political majority attempting to "extend its hold on power into the
future, when its members may no longer enjoy majority status" as "the problem of 'crosstemporal majorities"').
224. See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 617-18 (1996)
(describing the required evidentiary showing).
[T]he lack of coordination between the candidate and the source of the
expenditure ...prevents us from assuming, absent convincing evidence to the
contrary, that a limitation on political parties' independent expenditures is
necessary to combat a substantial danger of corruption of the electoral system. The
Government does not point to record evidence or legislative findings suggesting
any special corruption problem in respect to independent party expenditures.
Id.
225. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000).
226. Id. at 391. In Nixon, the Court required only an affidavit from a legislator and the
passage of a campaign finance ballot initiative to establish corruption sufficient to warrant
contribution limits, and some have suggested that the evidentiary standard is effectively lower.
See D. Bruce La Pierre, The BipartisanCampaignReform Act, PoliticalParties,and the First
Amendment: Lessons From Missouri,80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1101, 1105 (2002) (asserting that since
Buckley, the state's burden of production in establishing the need for contribution limits has
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The Court might adopt an alternative evidentiary standard that responds to
institutional competencies and incentives. Such a test would create a rebuttable
presumption that reforms entrench incumbents and infringe upon individual
autonomy. To rebut that presumption, the defendants could produce evidence
227
showing that reform benefits incumbents no more than it does challengers
and that it refrains from infringing upon individual autonomy. In the
alternative, the defendants may rebut the presumption by showing that the
overall gains in deliberation and participation outweigh any small losses in
competition and autonomy. If the defendant successfully rebuts this initial
presumption, the burden of producing additional evidence about the negative
impact of the regulation on any of the four values shifts to the plaintiff. The
more compelling the defendant's evidence, the more evidence the plaintiff must
present to meet her burden successfully. The ultimate burden of persuasion,
however, would remain with the defendant at all times.
To meet their burdens, the parties could introduce testimony and studies
by political scientists, public interest groups, and other circumstantial
evidence.228 Information about the jurisdiction that campaign reform covers
would be most relevant, although parties could draw inferences from the effects
of regulations and unregulated activity in other jurisdictions. Numbers of
people and percentages of the population helped or harmed by the regulationas well as the frequency with which the regulation impacts these individuals,
the probability that they would be affected, and to what extent they would be
affected-would be relevant but not dispositive. In addition to testimony and
studies presented by the parties, the judge should examine the adequacy of the
legislature's investigation of the facts. 229 Thejudge should consider any factors
diminished).
227. The term "incumbents" may be used to refer to either incumbent individual
government officials or an incumbent majority party within a legislature.
228. Similarly, expert reports, surveys, and polls should not be disqualified due to hearsay
and other evidentiary rules. The purpose of the fact-finding tools, which legislatures often use
to deal with these very types of questions, is to make fact finding by a judge more manageable.
Few judges desire to hear direct testimony from thousands of random citizens in order to reach a
conclusion regarding the citizens' perception ofmoney in politics. The technical challenges that
result from the political nature of the facts should not be held against the parties.
229. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 107, at 37 (discussing Whiting v. California, 279
U.S. 357 (1927), in which the Court accepted the California legislature's determination that a
law criminalizing communist activity was necessary to public peace). Unfortunately, ballot
initiatives, which may allow for the most effective reform because self-interested legislators do
not enact them, would lack a legislative record. See David Schultz, Proving Political
Corruption:Documenting the Evidence Required to Sustain CampaignFinanceReform Laws,
18 REv. LIT[G. 85, 113 (1999) (stating that courts invalidated political contribution and
expenditure limits passed by ballot initiative in Alaska, Arkansas, and Austin, Texas because of
the absence of legislative records or findings).
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that have arisen since the legislative investigation that might impact the extent
to which the regulation advances or detracts from the values.230
C. The Least Imperfect Solution
Although balancing clearer values is less than perfect, the test is a good
compromise of guidance and flexibility. As stated, the test clearly articulates
four values: democratic deliberation, widespread participation, individual
autonomy, and electoral competition. The test requires that courts invalidate a
statutory provision in which the harms to these four values that arise from the
provision, on the whole, outweigh the provision's benefits to these values.
The same criticisms that this Article applies to conventional overbreadth
tests could be leveled against balancing the four values. Preconceived notions
of different judges, for example, might lead them to emphasize particular
values or facts over others. Any judicial test, however, must be examined in
light of the alternatives. Inflexible rules such as an express advocacy test might
provide mechanical guidance. Such tests become obsolete quickly due to the
evolving nature of campaign practices and reforms. Judicial rules, regardless of
where they are set, also gloss over important democratic values. At the other
end of the spectrum, current overbreadth doctrines fail to articulate values
clearly or to address thorny empirical issues, forcing even the best judges to
make decisions, often subconsciously, based on their own implicit assumptions
and values. In the absence of a perfect solution, this Article's balancing test
provides a good compromise of substantive democratic values, sensitivity to
context, and judicial guidance in this difficult area.'
Some might argue that political assumptions will influence judicial use of
the balancing test and that judges lack the capacity to articulate and apply these
four democratic values.232 While political assumptions may influence judicial
230. Richardson, supra note 107, at 36.
231. It is interesting to note Professor Gerken's perspective that:
One need not adhere to a highly philosophical, top-down approach to lawyering to
conclude that theory has a role to play in judicial decisionmaking. From a
pragmatic perspective, incompletely or minimally theorized agreements may
deprive courts of the opportunity to articulate mediating principles that can cabin
judicial discretion, render doctrine more coherent, and avoid the trap of inflexible
rules or mechanically applied proxies.
Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and
Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1411, 1466 (2002).
232. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY
FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GoRE 163 (forthcoming 2003) (asserting that the Court should

not provide a uniform definition of political equality); Bruce E.Cain, Commentary, Garrett's
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use of the balancing test, the concrete listing of the most important values
allows judges to develop at least a common starting point from which to
analyze cases. In the absence of explicitly articulated common values, judges
rely on their own assumptions about how democracy should work to apply the
substantial overbreadth doctrine. These assumptions often remain unstated and
are therefore not subject to challenge or debate, resulting in inconsistent
decisionmaking. Explicit normative engagement is likely once judges are
required to explain how their decisions advance specific values. An honest
exchange about the values that are to be balanced, rather than a glossing over of
difficult issues with abstract rhetoric and mechanical lines, will allow for the
development of a more coherent doctrine.
Some might doubt the competency of courts to balance normative values
and engage in political fact-finding. Section Two Voting Rights Act claims,
however, require that a court take account of polls, past election results, and
other political factors to make a decision based on a "totality of the
circumstances. 2 33 In Section Five Voting Rights Act cases, courts determine
"retrogression" of minority voting strength by weighing factors such as whether
minority gains in a redistricting plan as a whole offset the loss in a 234
particular
district and whether the plan adds or subtracts "influence districts.
The takings doctrine offers an analogy to the benefits of balancing values
in the campaign finance context. In 1922, the Court recognized that if a
regulation goes "too far" in infringing on property rights, it constitutes an
unconstitutional taking of property.235 It was not until 1978, however, that the
Court crafted a balancing test to improvejudges' ability to determine whether a
regulatory taking exists.236 Difficult cases still arose after the adoption of the
Temptation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1589, 1589-90, 1600-03 (1999) (criticizing ballot notations as a
slippery-slope to greater judicial intrusion into the electoral process); Daniel H. Lowenstein,
The Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics-andBe Thankful for Small Favors, in THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCEss 245, 258-65 (David K. Ryden
ed., 2000) (criticizing theories that support aggressive judicial review in election law).
233. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 (1986).
234. See Georgia v. Ashcrofl, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 2511-12 (2003) (describing the rough
balance in majority-minority districting between boosting minority representation and isolating
minority voters from the rest of the state). Courts have also used context-specific,
circumstantial evidence to make politically tinged decisions about whether members of the
Communist party represented a "clear and present danger" to the United States. See Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508-11 (1951) (applying the "clear and present danger" test not
rigidly, but in light of the circumstances of the case); see also Richardson, supra note 107, at 10
(discussing the importance of the circumstances in which an utterance is made to the
determination that evil will probably ensue).
235. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
236. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978)
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balancing test, but fewer of them existed because judges and legislators had
more guidance. As with regulatory takings, the balancing of clearer values in
the campaign finance context reduces the extent to which outcomes turn on
judicial guesswork.
Difficult campaign finance cases will continue to surface. The most
difficult campaign reforms to review will combine both negative and positive
effects-the reform that infringes on individual autonomy and disadvantages
challenger candidates, for example, but enhances deliberation and widespread
participation. Nevertheless, a clearer articulation of values and evidentiary
standards will provide greater direction to judges and will result in fewer
difficult cases than under the current overbreadth doctrine.
D. Application ofBalancing ClearlyDefined Values to the
ElectioneeringProvisions
This Article now turns from abstract values to a detailed application of the
balancing test to the restriction on nonprofit electioneering spending and a brief
explanation of how the other provisions would fare. This Subpart concludes by
explaining the test's comparative benefits over the conventional overbreadth
doctrine and an express advocacy rule. 237
1. Applying the Balancing Test
The balancing test this Article proposes would likely tolerate the
restriction on electioneering spending by nonprofit organizations, but-unlike
the majority opinion in McConnell-only with regard to those funds that the
nonprofit receives from business corporations or labor unions. The
electioneering provisions prohibit nonprofit corporations that receive money
from business corporations or unions from spending their general treasury
funds, as distinguished from segregated PAC funds, on electioneering
communications. An "electioneering communication" consists of (1) any
television, radio, cable, or satellite broadcast, (2) that refers to a clearly
(establishing that the factors to balance in determining aregulatory taking include: (]) character
of governmental action; (2) economic impact; and (3) interference with reasonable investmentbacked expectations).
237. The analysis below relies on hypothetical evidence. As stated above, to prevent overreliance on political assumptions, courts should avoid the temptation to take judicial notice of
likely political incentives and effects. Instead, they should require that the parties develop a
factual record.
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identified candidate for federal office, (3) run within sixty days before a general
election or thirty days before a primary election, (4) that can be received by at
least 50,000 people in the district the federal candidate seeks to represent." 8
The court should invalidate the nonprofit restriction if the harms to
competition, deliberation, participation, and autonomy that arise from the
restriction, on the whole, outweigh the benefits to these values that result from
the restriction. Due to the diverse ideological agendas of nonprofits, the
restriction on nonprofits probably does not dampen competition by entrenching
incumbents over challengers.
Studies showing that most nonprofit
advertisements broadcast in past elections depicted incumbents positively and
challengers negatively would strengthen this assumption.2 39
The nonprofit restrictions, however, do raise complicated issues regarding
deliberation, widespread participation, and individual autonomy that were
overlooked by the majority opinion in McConnell and inadequately articulated
by the Kennedy dissent. Nonprofit restrictions promote deliberation and
widespread participation because they prevent circumvention of the restriction
on corporate and union electioneering spending. The threat that a disgruntled
business corporation, for example, will use resources from its general treasury
to run attack ads in the final hours of a campaign interferes with legislative
deliberation. Further, such spending alienates potential voters who feel as
though their participation is less meaningful relative to the influence of
corporate treasuries. The restriction on nonprofit spending prevents a business
corporation or union from using resources from its general treasury to set up
and fund a nonprofit like Citizens for Better Medicare that will run attack ads in
the final hours of a campaign.
Many nonprofits that accept limited funds from corporations and unions,
however, are not fronts for business corporations or unions. Individuals
organize nonprofits like the ACLU, the NRA, and the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to advance issues rather than
profits. Nonprofits engage in research, organizing, and advocacy, and are likely
to make unique and important contributions to citizen and legislative
deliberation.
Nonprofit spending also advances widespread participation and individual
autonomy. Whereas many shareholders of business corporations view their

238. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201, 116 Stat. 81,
88-90 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2002)).
239. The study would be especially effective if it showed that advertisements that primarily
promote tourism, pending legislation, state candidates, and ballot initiatives were more likely to
feature incumbents in a positive light.
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shares as investments rather than associational mechanisms,24 ° nonprofits serve
as important vehicles for individual citizens to participate in an exchange about
public issues. To the extent that people choose to make, for example, modest
fifty-dollar contributions to these nonprofits to combine their resources to
promote advertisements they could not otherwise afford, these organizations
24
facilitate meaningful, widespread participation and individual autonomy. '
Unlike shareholders of a business corporation, individual contributors to a
nonprofit corporation generally expect their funds to be used to engage in
political expression that is consistent with the stated objectives of the nonprofit
corporation.242 Elected officials who respond to nonprofits are responding to
the desires of people who have assembled to further a particular issue. Such a
situation differs from government responsiveness to the raw economic power of
many business
corporations that sell shares rather than issues to amass
2 43
capital.
240. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 807 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("[C]orporate expenditures designed to further political causes lack the connection
with individual self-expression which is one of the principal justifications for the constitutional
protection of speech provided by the First Amendment. Ideas which are not a product of
individual choice are entitled to less First Amendment protection."). Randall P. Bezanson
notes:
The requirement that speech be traceable to the intention and beliefs of individuals
in order for the liberty of speaking to apply is an important factor in the
institutional speech calculus .... It serves to distinguish untraceable, and therefore
institutional, speech from individual speech that occurs in a collective or corporate
form.
Randall P. Bezanson, InstitutionalSpeech, 80 IOWA L. REv. 735, 749 (1995); see also Adam P.
Hall, Note, Regulating Corporate"Speech" in PublicElections,39 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1313,
1320 (1989) (stating that First Amendment protection based on self-realization "does not seem
appropriate for artificial persons such as corporations, unless the corporation is utilized as an
associational mechanism through which its members can exercise their individual rights to selfexpression").
241. See Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74
YALE L.J. 1, 4, 22 (1964) (discussing the unique qualities of associations).
242. See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,260-61 (1986) ("Individuals
who contribute to [Massachusetts Citizens for Life] are fully aware of its political purposes, and
in fact contribute precisely because they support those purposes.").
243. A court, of course, should focus on evidence that supports and challenges these
general assertions. For example, some citizens may refrain from participating because they
believe nonprofits are "special interest groups" that control the democratic process. Nonprofits
do not always reflect their contributors' views, and restraints on nonprofit spending might not
infringe on the autonomy of these contributors. For example, a contributor could clearly
support a cause yet oppose a candidate that the nonprofit supports because of the candidate's
stand on other issues. Further, unlike corporate shareholders who enjoy voting power,
contributors often have little recourse when they disagree with the nonprofits' electioneering.
Hall, supra note 240, at 1340-41.
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These values are not diminished simply because an organization accepts
donations from business corporations or unions. Distinguishing ideological
nonprofits that receive a few business contributions, such as the ACLU or the
NRA,244 from nonprofits organized and funded primarily by business
corporations, like Citizens for Better Medicare, presents a formidable
challenge. Although a nonprofit could sponsor electioneering communications
with funds from a segregated Political Action Committee (PAC), this option
might burden small, individual contributors who are required to donate to both
a PAC and a general expense fund. In balancing the relevant values, a court
might resolve the dilemma by limiting the application of the nonprofit
electioneering restrictions to nonprofit funds that originate from entities other
than natural persons. 245 This would effectively require that nonprofits segregate
corporate and union contributions to ensure the funds are not used for
electioneering.
With regard to the other electioneering provisions, a court balancing the
four values might uphold the disclosure requirements and the restrictions on
corporate and union spending. Disclosure provides information that furthers
deliberation, but it does not interfere with individual autonomy to the extent
that the nonprofit spending restriction might. As mentioned above, corporate
spending poses special threats to legislative deliberation and generally does not
advance individual autonomy and widespread participation to the same extent
as nonprofit spending. Distinctions between unions and corporations might
cause a court to consider invalidating the union restriction. 24' Electoral
competition concerns, however, might counsel against upholding corporate
restrictions while allowing overwhelmingly pro-Democratic unions to spend on
electioneering ads. Although the Court upheld restrictions on union spending
for the first time in McConnell, it provided no explanation for this expansion of
campaign finance doctrine. At the very least, clearer values would prompt a
court to explain the principles that undergird its decision to uphold union
spending restrictions.
244. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,698 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) ("With the imprimaturof this Court, it is now a felony in Michigan for the Sierra
Club, or the American Civil Liberties Union, or the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, to advise
the public how a candidate voted on issues of urgent concern to its members.").
245. Note that evidence may show, now or at some future time, that spending by nonprofits
(or by individuals) causes grave harm to values like deliberation and participation, thus
warranting limitations on such spending.
246. Unions represent a large group of people rather than financial interests, and thus union
restrictions might pose a greater threat to widespread participation. Union spending presents
fewer individual autonomy problems because union members, unlike shareholders, can request
that the union not use their dues to support political causes. 11 C.F.R. § I 14.5(a)(1) (2003).
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2. A ComparativeAnalysis of Tests
Judicial balancing of specific values enhances both normative guidance
and sensitivity to context in judicial review of campaign reforms. A quick
application of conventional overbreadth and express advocacy tests to the
electioneering provisions might be helpful before comparing them to the
balancing of values. The conventional overbreadth doctrine would require a
court to compare the proportion of invalid applications of the electioneering
provisions to valid applications of the provisions. Due to the contested
meaning of "substantial" and nebulous evidentiary standards, some judges
might uphold the law while others might strike it down, as evidenced by the
Stevens/O'Connor majority opinion and the Kennedy dissent in McConnell. A
judge applying the express advocacy test would likely follow Justice Thomas's
path and invalidate all four of the electioneering provisions for a different
reason: Each provision regulates spending on advertisements that do not
contain express words of advocacy like "vote for" or "defeat."
Legal, technological, and social changes in politics abound, and the
proposed balancing test would allow courts to adhere to a stable set of values
while also responding to context-specific factors more effectively than other
tests. For example, the express advocacy test, focused solely on the content of
the regulated speech, would strike down the electioneering disclosure provision
even though it does not burden speech to the same degree as limits on
electioneering spending. A judge applying the conventional overbreadth tests
might do the same, referencing the possible invalidity of seventeen percent of
the disclosure provision applications. Different types of regulation, however,
advance the state's interest and infringe on expression to varying degrees. A
disclosure provision with a seventeen percent invalid application rate, for
example, might be less troubling than a spending restriction in which seventeen
percent of the applications are invalid.
Balancing these values not only allows judges to respond to the
differences between the regulations but also supports the distinction with
principled analysis. The public dissemination of spending data that stems from
disclosure advances democratic deliberation. Further, disclosure does not
restrict spending on speech. Advertisements that attack legislation like
Sarbanes-Oxley, for example, will still be a part of public deliberation so long
as sponsors disclose spending on such ads. In contrast, nonprofit spending
restrictions can sometimes reduce deliberation.
For similar reasons, disclosure causes minimal harm to individual
autonomy. The threat to individual autonomy is reduced further because the
disclosure provisions only apply to those who spend more than $10,000 per
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Disclosure will not likely represent an
year on electioneering.247
insurmountable regulatory burden for those who can afford to spend this much
on speech. Although large spenders may prefer to influence public issues
anonymously, democratic deliberation outweighs the autonomy interest
advanced by anonymous spending. 48
Further, numbers like seventeen percent seem credible and weighty, but
they mislead judges. Different applications of any single statute are often not
simply "invalid" or "valid," but advance the state's interest and infringe upon
expressive values to varying degrees. Even if such categorization were useful,
seventeen percent is not the percentage of ads that pose no threat of corruption
or appearance of corruption. Instead, it is the percentage of ads that study
participants classified as primarily advancing an issue or a cause rather than a
candidacy. An ad designed primarily to advance an issue can corrupt the
process as well, especially if it casts a member of Congress in a positive or
negative light.249
In short, the balancing process allows a court to focus on how values are
manifested in particular contexts. Tests that focus on counting invalid
applications or words of express advocacy are cumbersome tools to apply in a
fluid political environment. Values are better than fixed words or activities in
defining the boundaries of legislative authority over campaign finance.
The balancing of clearly defined values also provides greater normative
guidance than conventional overbreadth doctrine, which relies on nebulous
terms like "substantial." Granted, people will disagree about whether particular
activities or regulations advance the values and about how to resolve conflicts
between the values, but most people can understand the normative goal of
invalidating regulations that do more harm than good. A "substantial" amount
of overbreadth, on the other hand, is unclear and contested. Is it five percent?
Is it thirty-five percent? The four values also provide more guidance than
abstract phrases like "prevention of corruption." They unpack such terms and
explain the democratic objectives inherent in promoting expressive activity and
in regulating political money.
247. Bipartisan Campaign ReformAct of 2002, Pub. L.No. 107-155, § 201, i116Stat. 81,
90 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2002)).
248. The threat to autonomy is minimal. Those who disclose will not likely face
intimidation, loss of employment, or physical violence when their identities are disclosed. Cf.
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (holding that an Alabama
court's contempt order against the NAACP for refusing to disclose its membership lists
abridged the NAACP members' right "to engage in lawful association in support of their
common beliefs").
249. This factor was overlooked by Judge Richard Leon. McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at
798.
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These democratic values bring the Court's campaign finance decisions
together into a coherent whole. They allow courts to respect more fully both
expressive values and legislative authority, and give legislatures clearer
guidance for crafting reforms. Further, the values themselves are substantively
important-they represent what many believe are essential components of
democracy. Collectively, the values expose the unbalanced nature of tools like
the express advocacy test, which overemphasizes the promotion of individual
autonomy at the expense of the democratic deliberation and widespread
participation values.
VI. Conclusion
This Article uses the Court's conflicting opinions in McConnellv. FEC to
illustrate problems with current doctrine, but its analysis has far-reaching
implications for the next generation of campaign finance reform and
jurisprudence. Evasion has emerged as a primary challenge to campaign
finance regulation and Congress and state and local legislatures have begun to
close loopholes. The primary questions that remain ask how far campaign
finance regulations can go to prevent circumvention before they cover an
unacceptable amount of speech, and how courts should make this judgment in a
principled manner.
The Court in McConnell failed to take the opportunity to develop tools to
identify the boundaries of campaign reform. This Article proposes that in
future cases the Court adopt a judicial test that determines whether a campaign
regulation, on balance, results in greater benefit than harm to four values:
democratic deliberation, widespread participation, individual autonomy, and
electoral competition. The Court should also craft clearer evidentiary standards
that allow judges to make more competent and consistent predictions about the
probable political effects of reform.
Even if the Court does not substitute or supplement conventional
overbreadth tools with a formal balancing test, legislators should consider the
four values when drafting reforms, and judges should use them in reviewing
reforms. Rather than engaging in covert assumptions about cloudy objectives,
legislators and judges should explicitly examine whether a reform advances the
values underlying the Court's reasoning in its campaign finance cases.
Granted, an adoption of a formal balancing test might do this most efficiently.
The larger objective, however, is for political and judicial decision-makers to
recognize that campaign finance involves a balancing of specific democratic
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values, and that greater understanding and coherence arises through explicit
discussion of those values.

